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1. Introduction 
 
 
Whether it is human-induced, or natural, there is a growing consensus that climate change 
is a reality and it is a security threat (Bob et al. 2014; Barnett and Adger 2007; McDonald 2013). 
While it is possible that climate -driven environmental stress might create opportunities and 
positive outcomes, it is generally accepted that it will have “severe consequences on the lives and 
livelihoods of millions of people around the world” (Barnett and Adger 2007:640). Despite this, 
there has not been a consensus on the relationship between climate change and violent conflict to 
date (Adger et al. 2014; Meierding 2013; Klomp and Bulte 2013; Theisen et al. 2013; Buhaug 
2010; Burke et al. 2009). What is certain is that “climate change acts as a ‘threat-multiplier’”, 
directly exacerbating the existing political, economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities of 
the people (Huntjens and Nachbar 2015:1).  
The impacts of climate change reach across borders, but certain areas are particularly 
susceptible; one of them being the Sahel zone in sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC 2014). The Sahel is 
“dubbed ‘ground zero’ for climate change” due to its highly vulnerable population and extreme 
climatic conditions (IRIN & OCHA 2008, para.1). It has already experienced the first ‘climate 
wars,’ referring particularly to clashes between sedentary farmers and herders (Mjos 2007). A 
rich body of case-study literature has assessed the relationship between these different producer 
groups in Africa (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009; Benjaminsen, Maganga and Abdallah 2009; 
Witsenburg and Adano 2007; Moritz 2006; Turner 2004). Still, how exactly, and why, climate-
induced environmental stress leads to conflicts in some areas and not others require attention.  
Climate-related conflicts often take the form of a ‘communal conflict’, which is fought 
between communally-identified groups along ethnic, language and religious lines. In Africa, the 
concepts of ethnicity and livelihood are closely linked to one another. Since farmers and herders 
often belong to a particular ethnic group, it should not come as a surprise that climate-related 
conflicts are most likely to occur among different land users. As such, these communal conflicts 
are often fought over access to resources such as land, pasture and wells (Sundberg et al. 2012).  
Extreme and unreliable weather patterns caused by climate change reduce the availability of 
these natural resources. As competition increases over resources access, inter-group tensions 
sometimes turn into a violent clash, resulting in casualties and material damage.  
2 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
In selecting the area of focus for this thesis, I was first and foremost inspired by the 
Planetary Security Initiative. The aim of this project is “to increase awareness, deepen 
knowledge, and to develop … policies and good practice guidance” to help various actors to 
sustain peace and cooperation when facing climate change and other global environmental 
challenges (Planetary Security Initiative, 23 March 2017). One of the recurring themes of the 
Planetary Security Conference in 2016 was the need to avoid one-size-fit all approach in 
developing solutions, and “to be sensitive to contextual factors unique to each socio-ecological 
system” (Homer-Dixon 1994:20). Not only these debates have confirmed that the implications of 
climate change could vary across time and space, but they have also recognized the need to 
expand the scope of the discussions beyond the national level.  
However, literature on the climate-conflict nexus has predominantly focused on armed 
conflicts, in which the state is one of the perpetrators, while paying little attention to dynamics 
taking place on the sub-national level (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). Additionally, the existing 
literature is still unable to provide a robust argument for why certain areas experience conflict 
due to climate impacts but not others. Thus, in an attempt to address this gap in the literature, this 
thesis seeks to evaluate the context in which climate-induced environmental stress acts as a 
catalyst for communal conflict in the West African Sahel, particularly by looking at Mali and 
Burkina Faso. This requires me to study two specific, yet interlinked, questions: How does 
climate-induced environmental stress impacts vulnerabilities? What factors need to be present 
for communal conflicts to occur?  
 
1.1. Organization of the Thesis 
This research contains five chapters. In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature on the 
concepts of climate security, human security, vulnerability and communal conflict, which 
provide some basis for the theoretical framework presented in the second part of the chapter. In 
Chapter 3, I introduce my research design, present my variables and data, and discuss the 
strengths and limitations of my research. The empirical analysis is done in Chapter 4 in four 
separate sections. Here, I first provide a background for the West African Sahel in general. Then, 
I study the environmental and political contexts in both Mali and Burkina Faso in detail and 
assess the factors that connect climate change and communal conflict. Lastly, in Chapter 5, I 
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discuss the main findings, revisit research limitations and offer recommendations for future 
research.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The literature review begins by summarizing previous research that identifies climate 
change as a security concern; conceptualizes human security, vulnerability and communal 
conflict; and finally introduces two theoretical frameworks to understand the relationship 
between climate change and conflict.  
 
2.1. Previous Research 
2.1.1. The Securitization of Climate Change 
Climate change is described as “any change in climate over time caused by natural 
variability or human activities” (Yanda and Bronkhorst 2011:2). As Adger (2006) points out, it 
“represents a classic multi-scale global change problem in that it is characterized by indefinitely 
diverse actors, multiple stressors and multiple time scales” (p.273). Evidence suggests that the 
impacts of climate change will have far reaching effects, and considerably increase the burden on 
societies that are already vulnerable to climate variations; these impacts will undermine both 
ecological and social systems (Barnett and Adger 2007; IPCC 2007).  
The last few decades have witnessed a shift in the conceptualization of climate change. 
The concept, once a concern of environment ministers, became a topic to be discussed at the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This shift towards the securitization of climate change 
followed a shift in the perception of the issue in the eyes of policy makers. In 2003, the Pentagon 
commissioned two scenarios to understand the implications of sudden climatic events for 
international security. These scenarios resulted in the classification of climate change “as the 
‘mother of all security problems’” (Brown 2007:1141; Stipp 2004, para.1). Shortly after, Sir 
David King, the chief scientists of the British government, argued that “climate change is a far 
greater threat to the world’s stability than international terrorism” (BBC News 2004, para.1). In 
addition, in April 2007, a group of eleven high ranking admirals and generals released a report 
stating that “climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as 
water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable, and [thus] presents a tangible 
threat to … national security interests” (Brown et al 2007). As a threat multiplier, it is believed 
that climate change carries a diverse set of “secondary risks, such as violent conflict, political 
instability, population displacements, poverty and hunger” (Ruttinger et al. 2015:5). Moreover, a 
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report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in June 2007 recognized a 
linkage between the conflict in Darfur and climate change, emphasizing the implications of the 
issue for peace and stability (UNEP 2007). With these developments, the significance of climate 
change for conflict and security has finally caught the political imagination, and created a 
noticeable shift in the way the issue is being addressed by decision-makers.   
Figure 1 captures the conceptual framework of how climate change might exacerbate the 
vulnerabilities and act as a threat multiplier. It is built on the 2009 report of the UN Secretary-
General on Climate Change and its possible security implications (UN General Assembly 2009; 
Hamro-Drotz 2014). Changes in the vulnerability-inducing climate variables such as 
temperature, rainfall, drought, flood and sea-level rise can disrupt: (1) food and water securities 
and health issues; (2) and the availability in natural resources. These, in turn, could lead to 
migration, resource competition, political instability, and localized conflicts. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hamro-Drotz (2014). 
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2.1.2. Human Security, Vulnerability and Resilience 
 In discussing the security implications of climate change, some limit their understanding 
to conflict and military matters (Buhaug 2010; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 2013); while others 
embrace a wider notion of human security that encompasses its impacts on livelihoods, 
vulnerable populations, food security and migration (Barnett and Adger 2007; Scheffran et al. 
2012). The 2005 World Summit Outcome defines human security as “the right of all people to 
live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair,” and recognizes that “all individuals, 
in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an 
equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential” (A/RES/60/1, 
para.143). The significance of human security concept for climate change discussions is 
acknowledged in the 2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, which suggests that changing 
availability of land and water resources could pose risk to human security by undermining 
individuals’ ability to look after themselves via limiting their access to vital resources (McCarthy 
et al. 2001). Including the human security concept into climate -security discussions is both 
constructive and instructive for a number of reasons: first, it covers a broader range of potential 
security implications of climate change, and second, it brings the policy focus on environmental, 
development and economic issues (Heinrigs 2010).  
 The primary emphasizes of human security is the individual; yet, “the processes that 
undermine or strengthen human security are often external to the locality of populations where 
individuals reside” (Barnett and Adger 2007:641). Africa, for instance, is believed to be one of 
the most vulnerable places to the impacts of climate change; yet, even within Africa the effects 
are not distributed evenly. This naturally raises the question of how we can understand 
vulnerability and what makes a place vulnerable to security implications of climate change.  
 The idea of vulnerability is generally understood as susceptibility to losses (Wisner 
2004:184). More specifically, the IPCC defines it as “the propensity or predisposition to be 
adversely affected” (IPCC Working Group II Report 2014:3). It is contrasted with the concept of 
resilience, which is understood as “the degree to which countries, communities, families or 
individuals are able to adapt to change” (Busby, Smith, and Krishnan 2014:52). In the context of 
exposure to climate events, resilience also refers to the capacity to “rebound, recoup or recover 
from a stimulus” (Rademaker 2016:9). Vulnerability determines the seriousness of climate-
related event based on political, economic, social or demographic factors (Brooks, Adger and 
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Kelly 2005). This suggests that vulnerability to ecological disasters may partially be explained 
by physical exposure; social disadvantages such as poverty and political marginalization are also 
important indicators of vulnerability. (Raleigh 2010). Limited political power and assets further 
restrict access to resources, narrowing the range of options available in times of stress (Raleigh 
2010).  
 
2.1.3. Communal Conflicts 
 The concept of conflict itself is a natural part of our daily lives, and it should not be 
treated as a synonym for violence. Coleman (2003) defines conflict as “the experience of 
incompatible activities”, which “prevents, obstructs, interferes, injures” the presence or 
effectiveness of another activity (Coleman 2003:6; Deutsch 1973:10). These experiences “can be 
observed within and between people and groups of people, can be expressed or left unexpressed, 
and can be experienced by the parties to the conflict or by observers external to the conflict” 
(Coleman 2003:6). This definition of conflict fits into Mitchell’s (1981) conception of ‘social 
conflict’, which he defines as “any situation in which two or more social entities or parties 
perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals” (cited in Brottem 2013:69).  
Literature on the climate change-conflict nexus has prominently focused on the national 
and regional levels, while disregarding the massive implications this might have on the sub-
national, or communal, level. The organization of a rebel movement requires resources, 
planning, know-how and mass of motivated recruits, and a civil conflict further necessitates a 
government that responds to its population with a military force (Buhaug 2015). These 
ingredients are not available to every society; hence, we may not always observe civil conflicts, 
despite potential causes of conflict being present. Climate change might have wider implications 
for other forms of political instability such as communal conflicts, which are generally seen as 
likely outcome of environmental stress than large-scale violence (Uexhell 2014; Theisen 2012; 
Field et al., 2012; Cederman and Gleditsch 2009).  
Elfversson and Brosche (2012) define communal conflict as “violent conflict between 
non-state groups that are [informally] organized along a shared communal identity” (para.3). 
Communal identity within this context is not only limited to ethnic or religious identity, but 
rather it incorporates any form of identification that is based on, for instance, a common history, 
culture, livelihood or core values. At the center of many communal conflicts is land. As such, 
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research that study communal conflicts often focus on clashes between sedentary farmers and 
nomadic herders (Hussein et al. 1999; Turner 2004). At its core, communal conflict1 is different 
than other types of armed conflict2; however, its consequences – the extent of suffering, damage, 
dislocation of individuals, etc. - can potentially be just as destructive.  
 This literature overview suggests that the dynamics of climate change and its security 
implications are nothing but complex. While there may be disagreements on how climate change 
affects conflicts around the globe, there is a general consensus that it is a security threat that 
needs to be addressed urgently. It also suggests that it is no longer so easy to separate climate 
change’s effects on different units – individual, national, international - as these are interlinked. 
Yet, the units of analysis that focus on the national and international levels continue to dominate 
the climate-conflict discourses. With individuals and communities being just as susceptible 
climate change, it is necessary to widen the scope of the existing literature to include the forces 
taking place on the sub-national level.  
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
In order to recognize an empirical climate-conflict relationship, we need to have the 
“knowledge about how [conflicts] happen, which requires theories that can explain the causal 
pathways that result in conflict” (Gemenne et al. 2014:6). For my research, I have identified two 
frameworks that I believe would provide the most comprehensive analysis – environmental 
security and horizontal inequalities. Especially within the context of climate-conflict nexus, I see 
these two frameworks complementary. While social, political and economic dimensions of 
conflict have received much attention in the literature, biophysical factors have been overlooked. 
Additionally, as stated earlier, climate change could act as a conflict catalyst by interacting with 
the existing social, political and economic circumstances. As such, by using two frameworks - 
one focusing on the environment and one on the socially constructed inequalities – I seek to 
                                                          
1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset operationalizes communal conflict as conflict that occurs on the 
sub-national level and involves informally organized groups, using any material means as arms and 
causing at least 25 battle-related deaths (Sundberg et al. 2012). The concept is conceptualized and 
operationalized in more detail in the Research Design section.  
2 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset defines armed conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al. 2002 
Version 4-2009:1).  
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capture the overall picture for how climate change might be connected to communal conflicts in 
the West African Sahel.  
 
2.2.1. Environmental Security 
In addressing the potential of climate-induced conflict, two literatures use the concept of 
vulnerability to frame their approach. The ‘environment-security’ discourse privileges ecological 
causes in determining conflict risk, and treats resource ‘scarcity’ as the central focus (Raleigh 
2010). It incorporates the issues of distribution and marginalization into conflict models. Both of 
these aspects are viewed as “functions of physical proximity and access to scarce resources,” 
which are to be facilitated by increasing demographics and pressures on natural resources 
(Raleigh 2010:71). 
The resource scarcity framework offers four key claims to link environmental 
degradation and violent conflict. First, environmental causes of violent conflict primarily involve 
natural resources such as land, water, forests and fish. Second, environmental stress is the 
product of the combination of environmental change, social inequality and population growth, 
and these factors are mutually reinforcing. Lastly, societies with higher adaptive capacity are 
more likely to avoid violent conflict and instability (Homer-Dixon 1994; Percival and Homer-
Dixon 1998; Raleigh and Urdal 2007). Following a neo-Malthusian line of argument, the 
resource scarcity framework assumes that individuals, who are deprived of their livelihoods and 
politically marginalized, do not have any choice apart from fighting for survival (Homer-Dixon 
2004). Moreover, it is easier for individual grievances to turn into group grievances in societies 
that are divided along ethnic, cultural and religious lines (Kahl 2006).  
The environmental security framework offers several case-based accounts of armed 
conflict and environmental issues, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kahl 2006). Yet, research 
that assess the causal mechanisms between climate and conflict has so far offered inconsistent 
results (Gleditsch 2012). Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug (2011) conducted one of the most 
comprehensive large-N studies, and their findings did not find any substantial evidence to 
confirm the link between drought and civil war. Additionally, the robustness of studies that does 
find evidence for a climate – civil war linkage has been heavily criticized (Buhaug 2010; 
Gleditsch 2012). This is because research focusing on the changing availability of natural 
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resources find that political and economic factors play a more significant role in determining the 
risk of civil wars ((Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Raleign and Urdal 2007; Theisen 2008).  
One potential explanation for the contradiction between the weak empirical evidence in 
the large-N studies and the strong claims offered by the environmental security literature might 
be the almost exclusive focus on armed rebellion involving the government in the former. The 
dataset used in these large-N studies focus on armed conflicts on the national level, and do not 
capture communal conflicts. Much of the arguments within the environmental security 
framework provide that pressures on primary natural resources are likely to spur inter-group 
violence rather than conflicts involving the state (Fjelde and von Uexkull 2012).  
 
2.2.2. Horizontal Inequalities  
 The theory of horizontal inequalities (HIs), in other words inequalities among culturally 
defined groups, suggests that “when cultural differences coincide with economic and political 
differences between groups, this can cause deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles” 
(Stewart and Brown 2007:222). These inequalities differ from “vertical inequalities (Vis) which 
measure inequality among individuals or households, not groups” (Stewart 2009:3). HIs offer 
several dimensions: economic HIs focus on issues such as ownership of assets, employment 
opportunities and income levels; social HIs look at access to various social services including 
accommodation, health care and education; political HIs concern about the disparities in power 
distribution and political opportunities; and cultural HIs focus on the recognition of customs, 
dialects and practices (Stewart 2010).  
 The relevance of any of these elements depends on their significance for the livelihood of 
a particular group. Land, for instance, is extremely important in many African countries where 
agriculture accounts for most income and employment. While each form of HIs stands on its 
own, they continuously interact with one another. Political power, for example, is both an end 
and a means as inequalities within this context often have implications for social and economic 
discriminations (Stewart 2010). Particularly in the case of Africa, patrimonial politics are the 
foundation of political systems (Raleigh 2010). This political structure is based on the political 
power, or status, of ethnic communities, favoring some groups over others. Hence, ethnic 
communities are distinguished by their political ‘relevance’ and ‘irrelevance’. This dynamic of 
political exclusion is important for climate-conflict discourses as vulnerability to climate change 
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does not only concern physical exposure. Factors such as poverty and political marginalization 
also affect communities’ vulnerabilities by limiting their access to resources such as food and 
water, and by reducing their capacity to cope with environmental stress (Gurr 1993; Scarritt 
1994). This then shapes the interactions among ethnic groups vis-à-vis social grievances, and 
their reactions to scarcity or distributional matters (Raleigh 2010).  
 
With this in mind, I seek to test the following hypotheses. 
 
H1.  Climate-induced environmental stress leads to communal conflict when some social 
groups are politically marginalized.  
 
 
The link between political marginalization and communal conflict within the context of 
climate change is to be observed through several mechanisms – competition for resources, 
perception of a lack of justice and mobilization by the political elite. These mechanisms are not 
limited to this study, they could be observed in other cases within conflict and peace studies as 
well. While these mechanisms could be treated separate from one another, this study seeks to 
treat them as a package, in which in order to establish a link between the variables, all three 
mechanisms need to be present.   
 
1. Competition for resources 
Climate change reduces the availability of natural resources physically, while political 
marginalization creates socially constructed boundaries, determining who has access to 
what/when/how (Homer-Dixon 1994). Shortages of natural resources as a result of climate 
change and political exclusion, as well as demographic growth, push different groups to compete 
for these vital resources for survival, which in some situations result in violent conflict (Mbaiwa 
and Darkkoh, 2005; Homer-Dixon 1994).  
 
2. Perception of injustice  
One or both groups perceive a sense of injustice or disrespect from the other. Especially when 
these groups are formed along ethnic lines, groups “see their vital interests threatened by other 
groups” (Horowitz 1985:565). For instance, sedentary farmers might feel this way when their 
crops are damaged intentionally or the damages are not being compensated adequately. For 
12 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
herders, this might occur as agriculture production and land tenure systems interfere with their 
livelihoods.  
 
3. Mobilization by the political elites 
Varshney (2002) and Posner (2005) argue that elite plays an important role in ensuring and 
maintaining political stability. When the elite is unified, meaning when it is “sufficiently 
cohesive, freely communicative internally, and, regardless of it … affiliation,” political stability 
in a given place can be expected (Higley, Field and Groholt 1976). It is because such unification 
symbolizes the shared desire for how the society is to be managed. In countries, where this 
unification is not present, then the elite could be seen to mobilize its constituencies for power 
and access to resources.  
 
Figure 2. Mechanisms 
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3. Research Design 
 
 
3.1. Methodology: Small-N Comparative Analysis 
 
The existing literature on the climate-conflict nexus shows that more in-depth analysis on 
the sub-national level is needed in order to understand the dynamics between these two 
phenomena and to develop appropriate solutions. Large-N studies have not been able to capture 
the implications of climate change for conflict dynamics, as these studies have focused on armed 
conflicts involving the state, rather than conflicts on the community level. This may be due to the 
availability of data on the national level, and difficulty of collecting such information on the sub-
national level. Moreover, the effects of climate change vary, sometimes significantly, across time 
and space. Identifying an ‘average’ effect across heterogenous sample may not always be 
productive, unless a common causal effect, provided by good theoretical frameworks, is 
expected (Buhaug 2015). For this purpose, I conduct a small-N comparative analysis with a Most 
Similar Systems Design (MSSD). More specifically, I construct a two-step approach: (1) in-case 
process tracing and (2) case comparison.  
 
Stage I. Process Tracing 
 In the first stage of this research, I use process tracing to assess the contexts in which 
communal conflicts have taken place. Brottem (2013) states that “it is exceedingly difficult to 
pinpoint the exact causal relationship between environmental change, human response and social 
conflict;” yet, process tracing can allow the researcher to unfold the processes and mechanisms 
between two phenomena (pp.20). Process tracing requires the reviewing of several types of 
sources, such as interview transcripts, official documents, historical accounts, various reports, 
and others to identify “whether the causal processes a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case 
are in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (Kirwin 
2010:97).  
 Collier et al (2004) view process tracing as a chain of observations, as opposed to 
“multiple observations of the same phenomena” and note that causal process observation 
“provides information about mechanism and context” (pp.253). Subscribing to this view enables 
me to identify and analyze the causes of the conflict, the actors involved, the framing of the 
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issue, and whether these events translated into a violent communal clash. At the very least, 
process tracing “allows [me] to offer a chronology of the events,” which is important “to 
establish the causal chain” (Kirwin 2010:98). In this regard, small-N analysis is an appropriate 
choice of approach as it is “best situated for confidently inferring the nature of causal order” 
(Lieberman 2005:441).  
Stage II. Case Comparison 
Case Selection 
In the second stage, I conduct a comparative case study based on the identified 
mechanisms in process tracing. By doing this, I intent to explore the variation in the dependent 
variable (the occurrence of communal conflict), in order to better understand the factors that 
affect its presence (Varshney 2002). I focus on two West African countries in the Sahel zone as 
my case studies, namely Mali and Burkina Faso. The Sahel zone is particularly interesting for 
any analysis that concerns climate change and conflict. The region has already experienced the 
first ‘climate wars’, in which different groups, such as farmers and herders, have engaged in 
ongoing clashes over natural resources (Mjos, 2007). Dubbed ‘ground zero’ for climate change, 
the Sahel contains highly vulnerable population and experiences extreme climatic conditions 
(IRIN & OCHA, 2008).  
 I choose Mali and Burkina Faso as case studies for several reasons. Their similarities – 
geographic location, poverty, diverse ethnic groups, dependence on land and water for 
livelihood, recurring drought, colonial history – allow me to conduct a Most Similar Systems 
Design (MSSD). Despite their similarities, Burkina Faso is a relatively peaceful country within 
the region and it has not experienced a communal conflict3. This makes Burkina Faso an 
exceptional case within the region and raises the questions of ‘how does climate-induced stress 
increase vulnerabilities?’ and ‘which factors need to be present for communal conflicts to 
occur?’   
In addition to the need for more sub-national level analysis, research on the occurrence of 
communal conflicts, as a result of climate change, tend to focus on the dependent variable. 
Studying cases in which both communal conflict and environmental stress exist creates a 
                                                          
3 See Section 3.2. for the conceptualization and operationalization of communal conflict. 
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selection bias and does not allow to systematically study the role of climate change as a catalyst 
for communal conflict. For this reason, I focus on cases that have different outcome of interests.   
 
3.2. Variables: Conceptualization and Operationalization 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, communal conflict, is conceptualized and operationalized 
according to the ‘Non-State Conflict Dataset (Version 2.5-2016),’ a project by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala 
University (Sundberg et al. 2012). Communal conflict is generally recognized as conflict 
standing along lines of communal identity. More specifically, the UCDP defines it as conflict 
that occurs on the sub-national level, which involves informally organized groups, using any 
material means as arms, and causing at least 25 battle-related deaths. “These are not groups that 
are permanently organized for combat, but who at times organize themselves along said lines to 
engage in fighting. This level of organization captures aspects of what is commonly referred as 
‘communal conflicts’” (Sundberg et al. 2012:4).  
Within the scope of this research, communal conflict specifically refers to land conflict. 
Climate-induced environmental stress, in the form of drought, excess rainfall and extreme 
variations in the weather patterns, has immediate impact on communities that heavily depend on 
natural resources such as land and water. In West Africa, and sub-Saharan region, agricultural 
practices are the primary source of food security and economic opportunities. Hence, I seek to 
study communal conflicts that occur among and/or within different land users.  
 
Intervening Variable 
Climate-induced environmental stress is treated as an intervening variable. Provided by 
the Economics of Planetary Security, a report by the Clingendael Institute and The Hague Centre 
for Strategic Studies (HCSS), environmental stress refers to “human and naturally induced 
pressure on the environment. As a subset of this, [climate-induced] stress refers to negative 
environmental impacts caused by gradual changes in atmospheric conditions” (Rademaker et al. 
2016:8).  
Environmental stress from climate change can be operationalized by looking primarily at 
the impacts of variations in temperature and rainfall on communities’ ability to access to water 
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and food supplies. As local communities’ livelihoods are largely dependent on the environment 
for food security and economic opportunities, studying the changes in the availability of food 
sources, and changes in the behavior and practices of the producer groups allows me to 
understand the impacts of environmental stress on communities.  
In conceptualizing climate-driven environmental stress, I seek to look at the 
continuous/gradual impacts of climate change as opposed to sudden shocks. The logic behind 
this choice is that this research does not treat climate change as a triggering event, rather it 
understands it as an intervening variable. The study at hand seeks to understand how climate 
related environmental stress changes the relationships between different groups over time. 
Furthermore, even in the cases of sudden climatic shocks, the effects of such shocks could often 
be observed for a long period of time. Thus, conceptualizing climate change as a continuous 
event fits better within the framework of this research.  
 
Independent Variable  
The independent variable of this research is political marginalization. The 
conceptualization and operationalization of the variable is determined by two sub-variables: (1) 
land tenure and cultivation rights, and (2) political representation. An analysis of land tenure and 
cultivation rights highlights whether these policies are discriminatory in nature. More 
specifically, by looking at these policies, I seek to find whether any particular producer group is 
excluded from the discussions of resource management and allocation. Secondly, I look at the 
representation of different groups within the government to see if any particular group is 
excluded from high-level positions. Therefore, I consider a group to be politically marginalized 
if: (1) the needs and rights of that group are not reflected within the land tenure policies, and (2) 
if the group has not been appointed for high-level positions within the government.    
 
3.3. Data Collection  
 In conducting this research, I relied on the existing academic articles/journals, various 
datasets and other sources that are more qualitative in nature, such as local non-governmental 
organization (NGO) reports/documents, United Nations (UN) reports/documents, newspaper 
articles, books and already conducted interviews.  
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 In order to identify communal conflicts, I studied and compared several datasets. Non-
State Conflict Dataset Version 2.5-2016 by UCDP; Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) 
by Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS); and Armed Conflict Dataset by the 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) all provide detailed accounts of 
different kinds of conflicts occurring around the world. I avoided relying on a single source for 
data collection to ensure that I include all the recorded incidents.  
To assess the changes in climatic patterns, and their implications for communities’ 
livelihoods, I collected information from various sources, including but not limited to, the World 
Bank Data, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), USAID, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), and 
official reports from the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso. Lastly, information and 
contextual knowledge about political marginalization of groups primarily retrieved from 
academic papers and NGO reports.  
 
3.4. Strengths and Limitations 
 This research consists of several strengths and limitations. First and foremost,  
the topic is highly relevant for the present day global security issues. Until recently, climate 
change was considered purely as an environmental concern; today, it is a “global threat … that 
know[s] no borders” (John Kerry, 2014). This shift in the perception certainly emphasizes the 
potential of climate change in impacting our societal stability; yet it also suggests that we are yet 
to understand the true capacity of climate change and its mechanisms in doing so.  
The study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it studies the 
relationship between climate change and conflict by focusing on the sub-national level, which is 
an area that has been largely ignored. Understanding the dynamics taking place on the national, 
regional and international levels are important for any climate-conflict discourses; yet, this 
should not be done at the expense of local level assessments. In order to develop appropriate 
solutions and implement them effectively, climate-conflict dynamics on the local level also need 
to be taken into account. Second, the choice of methodology, small-N comparative analysis, 
allows me to identify local issues and processes. Unlike large-N studies, small-N studies provide 
more detailed analysis of the dynamics on the ground as it is known for having high interval 
validity.  
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Moreover, this research focuses on two cases, Mali and Burkina Faso, which have 
different outcome of interests. Research in this field has tried to understand the climate-conflict 
nexus by selecting cases that have experienced both climate change and conflict. This creates a 
selection bias and leads to false conclusions, as the findings might not reflect what is happening 
elsewhere. By selecting cases with a different outcome of interest, I attempt to avoid committing 
a selection bias.  Lastly, two different theoretical frameworks, environmental security and 
horizontal inequalities, are used in conducting this thesis. Since climate change acts as a threat-
multiplier, using different approaches provides new insights about the climate-conflict 
relationship.   
  In addition to these strengths, there are also several limitations. The selection of small-N 
analysis as the methodological approach is inherently known for having high internal validity 
and low external validity (George and Bennett 2005:25). This high internal validity allows me to 
develop a theory about the link between climate change and communal conflict. However, 
having a low external validity means that it is not realistic to “make robust generalizations when 
[there is] a sample of just two cases” (Halperin and Heath 2012:217). Until such a theory can be 
tested across more cases, the findings of a small-N analysis cannot be confidently generalized. 
 Another limitation concerns the scope and focus of this research. Due to the inability to 
conduct a field research and to collect data in person, there is a heavy reliance on the existing 
data and literature for information and contextual knowledge. This makes it a challenge to collect 
information on a local level, especially when only very limited data exists.  
 Finally, the operationalization of communal conflicts might exclude incidents that could 
be otherwise considered as communal conflicts. Communal conflict in this research is 
operationalized using at least 25-battle related deaths as the minimum threshold. As such, other 
incidents that result in less than 25-battle related deaths are not included. This might create a 
selection bias on its own; however, this is not the intention of this research. The decision to 
operationalize communal conflicts in this way is influenced by the availability of data and the 
scope of the study.  
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Introducing the West African Sahel 
The Sahel is the “semi-arid and arid region of Africa”, covering several countries, such as 
“Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Sudan” (Heinrigs 2010:5). 
Different accounts also suggest that the Sahel constitutes a “wider latitudinal belt,” extending to 
parts of the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Cameroon and Ethiopia (Nyong, Adesina 
and Osman-Elasha 2007:789). Annual grasses with shrubs, stunned trees and bushes make up the 
vegetal cover of the region; yet, these are much denser in the south (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. The Sahel Region  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WMO (2001) in Heinrigs (2010). 
 
The Sahelian zone is in fact one of the most productive crop regions in Africa (NASA 
2004). Despite its productivity, the region has a “dark history of famine tied to highly erratic 
rainfall” (NASA 2004, para.1). The difference in rainfall between the northern fringes and the 
south equals to approximately 400-500 mm (Brooks 2004). Additionally, the region has been 
experiencing a decrease in the overall annual rainfall levels, with “an increase in inter-annual and 
spatial variability” (Figure 4) (Nyong, Adesina and Osman-Elasha 2007:789).  
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Figure 4. Rainfall Variation in the Sahel: 1951-1975 and 1976-2000  
Source: Global International Waters Assessment 2004; SDRN/FAO; SWAC/OECD (2007) in Tremolieres (2013).  
 
Drought has been a recurring occurrence in the region for centuries; yet, the intensity and 
magnitude of these events have been on the rise (Figure 5) (Hulme et al. 2001). The 
unprecedented and long-lasting drought from the late 1960s to the late 1980s had resulted in the 
death of thousands of people and millions of animals (Mortimore 1998). According to the Palmer 
Drought Severity Index, drought still exist in the Sahel, and these events are “consistent with 
scenarios of anthropogenic enhanced greenhouse warming as described in modelling studies” 
(Nyong, Adesina and Osman-Elasha 2007:789). These findings suggest that the sea surface 
temperature (SST) has an important role in regulating precipitation in the Sahel zone. In fact, 
variations in the temperature of the ocean surface can explain more than a third of the observed 
rainfall variability in the region (Heinrigs 2010). The modelling studies suggest that the 
correlation between rainfall in the Sahel and the Tropical Indo-Pacific SST is negative, while 
there is a positive correlation with the Atlantic meridian SST gradient.  
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Figure 5. Droughts Timeline 
Source: Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat (SWAC)/OECD (2010) in Tremolieres (2013). 
 
 There is a visible difference of livelihood systems between northern and southern Sahel 
(Figure 6). While pastoralism is largely practiced in the northerly cultures, the southern region 
tends towards sedentary farming. Agriculture is the major source of livelihood system, 
contributing almost 40 percent of the GDP and employing over 50 percent of the working 
population (Table 1) (Nyong, Osman-Elasha and Adesina 2007). As such, agriculture makes up 
the main source of food security and economic opportunities in the region, and is closely linked 
with climatic trends and environmental conditions. Despite its significance, farming and irrigated 
agriculture only makes up five percent of the total land, and it is only possible around the 
perennial rivers. As such, extreme changes in rainfall and temperature are the biggest factors 
hindering agricultural production (Nyong, Osman-Elasha and Adesina 2007).  
 
 
22 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
Figure 6. Livelihood Systems in the Sahel 
Source: CILSS; FAO; FEWSNET; SWAG/OECD in Heinrigs 2010.  
 
Table 1. Socio-Economic Indicators in the Sahelian West 
 Total 
Population 
(in million) 
Rural 
Population 
(% of total) 
Agricultural 
population* 
(in % of total) 
Population Density Agricultural 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
(People 
per 
km2) 
(Agr. 
pop. Per 
arable 
land** 
km2) 
Senegal 15.13 56 726 537 284 15.4 
Gambia, The 1,990.92 40 784 1295 357 20.3 
Mauritania 4,067.56 40 522 33 355 20.8 
Mali 17,599.69 60 74 13 197 40.3 
Burkina Faso 18,105.57 70 92 61.8 261 35.7 
Niger 19,899.12 81 83 13 81 36.5 
Nigeria 182,201.96 52 26 1971 110 20.2 
* Agricultural population refers all individuals that depend on agriculture, fishing, hunting and forestry for their 
livelihood. It includes individuals that are economically active in agriculture sector, and their non-working 
dependants. / ** FAO defines arable land as “land under temporary crops, temporary meadows for moving or for 
pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow.”  
Source: World Bank Data (2015); FAO. (1 2016 / 2,3,4,5,6,7 2005) 
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4.1.1. Conceptual Definitions 
 Pastoralists and farmers are considered as two different producer groups, even though 
both can engage in livestock ownership and farming (OECD 2013). There exists a significant 
difference between them in terms of management and resilience (Turner 2004).   
 
Pastoralism 
 The concept of pastoralism is understood as an economy that is based on raising 
livestock, and it is often carried out by nomadic and sedentary communities. Nomadism is “the 
extent of spatial movement of the groups in question” (Shettima and Tar 2008:164). Thus, 
pastoral production and the extent of mobility can be understood as conceptually different from 
one another. Nomad groups could in theory obtain multiple resources to increase their incomes. 
Pastoralism, on the other hand, could also be undertaken from a fixed location. What is important 
to understand is that nomadism “represents an integral social, political and environmental 
dimension of pastoralism” (Shettima and Tar 2008:165). It is essentially “the technique and 
technology” of pastoralism (Shettima and Tar 2008:165).  
 Pastoralists’ strategy of moving around for grass and water enables them to “have access 
to heterogenous and unpredictable pasture resources, rather than relying on the hypothetical 
stability or uniformity of those resources” (Thebaud and Batterbury 2001:70). Pastoralists lead 
their cattle towards seasonal ponds during the vegetation period; and move to farm land at the 
beginning of the dry season, following the completion of the harvest (Adams and Mortimore 
1997). The majority of pastoralists include diverse range of animals in their herds, and engage in 
trading, hunting and gathering to increase their sources of income.  
 
Sedentary Crop Farming 
 Crop farming is a production system carried out by sedentary farmers. These groups are 
generally recognized as “farmers living in permanent settlements gaining their livelihood mainly 
from crop production, with domestic animals providing supplementary income” (Hussein 
1998:12). Regarding the livelihood strategies, farmers need to adapt to different seasons, as well 
as in-between periods. A farming year is organized around seasonal rainfall patterns; thus, it can 
be divided into three periods: planting, weeding and harvesting (Mortimore and Adams 2001). 
Similar to pastoralists, many farmers also have sought alternative sources of income, both on-
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farm and off-farm, to diversify their dependence on certain resources (Abdulai and CroleRees 
2001).   
 
4.1.2. History of Tension Between Land Users 
 Conflict between different types of land users is neither new nor limited to a particular 
geographical region. Conflict between settled and pastoral groups can be found in various 
earliest written records and is “mythically symbolized in many cultures” (Blench 2003:1). 
Conflict of interest could be observed between all kinds of groups, such as among herders, 
among farmers, and between farmers and herders (Table 2). These tensions in most cases lead to 
resource competition; yet, they do not always turn into violence clashes.  
 
Table 2. Conflict of interest over natural resources within the intra-production system 
Type of Producer Conflicts of Interest 
Farmers vs. Farmers High productivity fields (e.g. flood pool resources) 
Herders vs. Herders Dry season grazing (Tuareg vs. Fulani) 
Farmers vs. Herders Use of wetland resources 
Source: Moorehead (1991) in Hussein (1998):23.  
 
 The sub-region of the West African Sahel has been seeing increasing number of conflicts 
over resources that involve sedentary farmers and mobile pastoralists. Against the context of 
resource scarcity, environmental degradation, demographic change and political volatility, the 
region perhaps is showing signs of what Kaplan (1994) refers as ‘the coming anarchy’. One the 
key elements of this ‘anarchy’ is farmer-pastoralist conflict, which is profoundly engrained in the 
region’s history, ecology and political economy.  
This widespread existence of conflict between farmers and herders in this region is “due 
to a seasonal incompatibility between two different livelihoods” (Brottem 2016:549). Following 
the rainy season, farmers plan to harvest their crops, and at the same time, herders attempt to 
provide water and pasture to their animals before dry season begins in the same area. 
Historically, there has generally been a balance between these two land users regarding to the 
land usage. However, changing weather patterns, environmental conditions and livelihood 
strategies for adaptations have altered the ‘traditional schedules’ of farmers and herders; and 
intensified the tensions between these two producer groups. Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) argue 
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that these conflicts between farmers and herders are “seen to be a more probable outcome of 
climate change” than other circumstances (Brottem 2016:549).  
The traditional systems of production, processing and marketing dominate the livestock 
sector in West Africa; and the big share of the sheep, camel, goats and cattle belong to nomadic 
and semi-nomadic pastoralists. The pastoralists move within an extensive range of land, between 
the semi-arid north during the rainy season, and the humid south during the dry season (Moritz 
2006). The dependence on pasture and land for their herds require the nomadic and semi-
nomadic pastoralists to move within and across national boundaries, making it inevitable to 
contact with settled crop farmers.  
Although such interaction may not be favorable at times, in reality, the survival of both 
the pastoralists and crop farmers depend on the interaction between the two groups. Pastoralists 
need to access to farmland for grazing their animals, and the calories produced by the crop 
farmers. Farmers, in return, require the dairy and protein produced by the pastoral groups. 
According to Monod (1975), the existence of pastoralists relies on the contact with sedentary 
people. The two are connected, and such connection requires them to share the same resources 
such as land, water and fodder.   
  
26 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
4.2. Mali 
As a landlocked country (area: 1,240,278 square kilometres), Mali experiences four 
bioclimatic zones: Saharan, Sahelian, Sudanian and Guinean (Coulibaly 2017). Eighty percent of 
the labor force is occupied by agricultural activities, which make up approximately 50 percent of 
the country’s GDP. The agricultural sector is dominated by small-scale traditional rainfall-
dependent farming, and it mainly includes “cotton, millet, rice, corn, vegetables, peanuts; as well 
as cattle, sheep and goats” (CIA 2017: n.a.). Despite its heavy dependence on agriculture, the 
suitable land for it only constitutes to 14 percent, making sustainable land management a key 
concern (Climate Change Knowledge Portal 2017).   
Mali has a population of 17,467,108 (July 2016 est.), and an annual growth rate of 5.3 
percent (CIA 2017). The country consists of eight administrative divisions and thirteen 
ethnicities categorized into five groups (Figure 7): the Manding group, involving Bambaras and 
Malinkes, representing approximately 40 percent of the population; the Sudanian group, 
including Sarakoles, Sonrhai, Dogons and Bozons (20 percent); the Voltaic group, including 
Senoufos, Miniankas and Bobos (12 percent); the nomadic group, including Fulani, Tuaregs and 
Moors (17 percent); and the remainder, including Tocouleurs and others (11 percent) (Coulibaly 
2017).  
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Figure 7. Mali’s administrative divisions and ethnic groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Van Veen, Goff and Van Damme (2015); Chauzal and van Damme (2015) 
 
4.2.1. Climate Change and Mali 
Mali is particularly vulnerable to climate change due to its low economic development, 
limited land suitable for agriculture, and ongoing poverty. At the same time, climate change 
poses a threat to the country’s development efforts, and its ability to provide basic services such 
as health and nutrition (The World Bank Group 2011). Figure 8 displays the overall vulnerability 
of Mali to climate change, which includes 18 indicators4 categorized into three vulnerability 
components: climate exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity5 (USAID 2014). As shown in 
the figure, such vulnerability is higher in the areas of Mopti and Gao, due high climate 
variability; while the southern and southwestern parts of the country are less vulnerable. In these 
                                                          
4 See Appendix A for a full list of indicators.  
5 See Appendix B for vulnerability index of each component.  
28 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
findings, it is important to note that population distribution and the vulnerability index are not 
always treated independently. It is estimated that the areas with medium-level vulnerability are 
home to approximately 40 percent of Mali’s population, while another 32 percent live in areas of 
medium-high vulnerability. In contrast, those living within the highest vulnerability zone make 
up only six percent of the population (USAID 2014).  
 
Figure 8. Vulnerability Index of Mali6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: USAID (2014).  
 
Mali has been exposed to droughts and floods for many decades (Figure 9). The long-
lasting drought from the late 1960s to the late 1980s has caused detrimental effects on the 
society. The overall rainfall has decreased by 30 percent since 1968, destroying more than a third 
of livestock and leading to widespread food shortages (Holthuijzen 2011). The migration of 
pastoralists towards near permanent water sources due to these events has led to considerable 
overgrazing, and increase in tension between different communities. Crop losses in and around 
Mopti, Segou and Tombouctou regions is often explained by “extended dry spells, poor rainfall 
and dry conditions” (The World Bank Group 2011:7).  
                                                          
6 USAID excluded all areas north of 17.2oC latitude in this climate vulnerability mapping as the region is 
very sparsely populated. USAID provides two justifications for this: (1) measuring vulnerability is more 
meaningful for populated areas and climate variability may not have too much of an impact in this 
region due to already harsh conditions; (2) including data for the region may skew the results for the 
remainder of Mali.  
29 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
 
Figure 9. % Basin Area Impacted by Extremes and Natural Hazard Vulnerability 
(+ve for flood; -ve for drought) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group (2011) 
 
Temperature and Rainfall Variations 
 Since the 1960s, the mean annual temperature in Mali has increased by 0.8oC, which is 
estimated as an “average rate of 0.15oC per decade” (E&ES 2015:2). However, specific locations 
have different rates; for instance, the northern part has seen an increase of 0.5oC per decade 
during the summer season (Figure 10). Furthermore, the frequency of hot nights between 1960 
and 2003 has significantly increased; while the frequency of cold days during summer seasons 
has substantially decreased (Ministry for Environment and Sanitation, Mali 2008).  
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Figure 10. Current Trend in Summer Temperature - Increase per Decade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: USAID (2014); E&ES (2015) 
 
Rainfall, on the other hand, is less predictable than ever (Carvalho and Rozen 2016). 
While the early 1960s, 1990s and 2000s have seen particularly wet periods, other years were 
noticeably dry (Climate Change Knowledge Portal 2017). The National Direction of 
Meteorology finds that there has been an overall decrease in rainfall since the 1960s. The annual 
precipitation levels have normally varied between 500 and 1500 mm in the 1950s; yet, these 
levels have not exceeded 1300 mm in the past two decades (E&ES 2015). Additionally, the areas 
once received 1200mm of rainfall has shrunk significantly (Figure 11). The impacts of this 
decrease in rainfall could already be seen as early as the early 1970s in the central Inner Niger 
Delta. The flooded surface in this area had shrunk by 27,500 km2  between 1969 and 1973 
(Ministry for Environment and Sanitation, Mali 2008).  
 
 
 
 
31 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
Figure 11. Changes in Average Annual Rainfall 
1951-1970 (Left) and 1971-2000 (Right) 
 
 
Source: Diallo, M.M.A. (2011) in E&ES (2015).  
 
Mopti region of Mali is one of the areas in which the agricultural sector is concentrated 
(The World Bank Group 2011). It is critical for the country’s food security and is also “endowed 
with many ecosystem services” (The World Bank Group 2011:2). In Gao region, agriculture, 
livestock and fisheries are practiced in the valley along the Niger river. The magnitude of food 
production in Gao is lower than of Mopti due to, in part, its exposure to different climate 
variations (USAID 2015). Nevertheless, the wealth of both of regions, in terms of their capacity 
to provide food and income, depends on the Niger river. The flow of the Niger river in Mali has 
decreased “from 1300m3/second in 1978 to 895m3/second in 2002” (E&ES 2015:2). This, 
combined with the shrinking inundated surface of the central Inner Niger Delta, means 
decreasing resources and increasing competition for different land users, whose survival depends 
on the land.  
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Changes in Land Use Patterns 
 Forestry, pasture and agriculture are considered to be the major forms of land use in Mali, 
and the stability of crop production is closely linked to rainfall (Giannini et al. 2017).  The 
Sahelian center of Mali has experienced a major decrease in agricultural production following 
the abnormally wet years of 1950s and 1960s, and drought and famine of the early 1970s (Watts 
2012). Since then, the sector has been improving, despite the “most severe multiyear drought of 
the instrumental record (1982-84)” (Giannini et al. 2017:148). Agricultural land has been 
expanding for the past 40 years, even though precipitation has not fully recovered. During the 
1990s, arable land has doubled, and “tripled in the 2000s with respect to 1961” (Giannini et al. 
2017:148) (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12. Agricultural Land in Mali (1961-2014) 
 
 
Source: FAO (2017) 
 
This expansion of the agricultural land had negative implications for forest land, which 
has decreased by approximately 10 percent in the past two decades (FAOSTAT 2017). Several 
institutions (UNCCD 2010; WRI 2010) state that desertification rate will further increase in 
parallel with the increasing temperature. The mean annual temperature in Mali has already 
increased by 0.8oC since 1960. It is expected that decrease in rainfall and increase in extreme 
weather events will accelerate deforestation, and the pressure on forest land will further increase 
due to desertification (FAO 2012).  
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 Additionally, changes in the environment and the expansion of agricultural land meant 
increased number of herders moving into agricultural zones, where pasture and water are 
available. The droughts had forced pastoralists to move further south, and to settle in locations 
where they had traditionally only spent short periods of time. In his research, Brottem (2016) 
found that the number of pastoralists and livestock residing in the southern region of the country 
during the dry season has increased gradually (Figure 13). These extreme weather events had 
severely impacted the mobility of pastoral communities, and “contribute[d] to the increased 
frequency of farmer-herder conflict in the area” (Brottem 2016:549).  
 
Figure 13. Livestock in Mali: 1961-2007 
Source: FAO in Brottem (2016).  
 
Food Security 
One of the difficulties in assessing the impacts of climate change on food security is the 
lack of data on the past trends on this subject. Yet, there are projections by several biophysical 
models, using 2030 conditions as base, that provide some insights about what increasing 
temperate and unreliable rainfall might mean for the availability of food resources – of crops, 
60-75% increase since 1991 
Drought Years 
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forages and livestock – in Mali. These predictions about the future allow us to build assumptions 
about how increased temperature and extreme weather events might have impacted food sources.  
Simulations by the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC), which are projected 
by the Hadley Centre Coupled Model (HADCM) and the Canadian Global Coupled Model 
(CGCM), indicate that certain crops are more resilient to the impacts of climate change than 
others (Butt et al. 2005). Cotton yields show an increase, while the responses of millet depend on 
the location. Among the crop yields, the most vulnerable appears to be sorghum, and it is 
expected to decrease significantly. The HADCM suggests that “collectively 33 out of 48 crop-
region cases” will experience yield losses (Butt et al. 2005:362). The predicted decrease of 
sorghum yields in sub-humid areas, for instance, appears to be more modest (5-7 percent) 
compared to other areas with drier conditions (about 18 percent). The CGCM, on the other hand, 
provides slightly higher predictions for yield loss; yet, the overall trends offered by both models 
match one another.  
In regards to forage yields, the Phytomas Plant Growth Model (PHYGROW) estimates a 
decrease between five to 36 percent. The main reason for this is “the combined loss of grass 
basal area due to over grazing and reduced woody plant cover due to fuelwood harvesting, 
coupled with increasing temperatures during the growing season” (Butt et al. 2005:364). 
Additionally, the impact of climate change on livestock is assessed by the Nutrition Balance 
Analyzer Model (NUTBAL). According to this model, all livestock – cattle, sheep and goats – is 
expected to decrease, among which cattle appears to be the most vulnerable. NUTBAL suggests 
that the increased temperature will lead to loss of appetite, and ultimately result in “loss of 
weight and lower growth rates” (Butt et al. 2005:365).  
In Mali, a decrease in the availability of food sources not only means food insecurity but 
also livelihood insecurity. As mentioned earlier, Malians depend on the land for both food and 
economic opportunities. The predicted losses in these livelihood sources could translate into an 
“overall loss of welfare,” ranging between $70 and $142 million (Butt et al. 2005:370). It would 
also mean an increase in the risk of hunger from about 44 percent to over 70 percent of the 
population.  
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4.2.2. Communal Conflicts 
 In Mali, the military coup d’état of 2012 has received much attention for the discussions 
over the security implications of climate-induced environmental stress. While conflicts between 
pastoralists and the government over land, as well as other political and social factors, have been 
well studied and acknowledged, clashes taking place on the communal level have been largely 
overlooked.  
 Conflict between different communal groups is almost a daily occurrence in Mali, and in 
the West African Sahel in general. Yet, as discussed earlier, ‘conflict’ could take many forms 
and could have different consequences. In Mali, several communal low-intensity conflicts (less 
than 25 battle-related deaths) have taken place over the years; yet, these were not included in this 
study as it would not be possible to operationalize all of them. Using the framework set out by 
the Non-State Conflict Dataset by the UCDP, I identify only seven communal conflicts that 
turned into a high-intensity conflict, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Communal Conflicts in Mali  
Actor 1 Actor 2 Start Date End Date Fatalities Est.1 Location 
Fulani Salsalbe 08-12-1993 08-12-1993 29 Mopti Region 
Fulani Tuareg 05-07-1997* 05-07-1997 34 Gao Region 
Arab Kunta 14-07-1999 16-10-1999 59 Gao Region 
Dogon Fulani 25-05-2012** 25-05-2012** 40 Mopti Region 
Fulani Tuareg 06-02-2014* 06-02-2014 30 Gao Region 
Fulani Bambaras 06-05-2016** 06-05-2016 30 Mopti Region 
Fulani Bambaras 13-02-2017** 13-02-2017 30 Mopti Region 
 
* This conflict is believed to be originated in 31-03-1997 but the given episode of conflict activity reached 25 battle-
related deaths on this date.  
** Day assigned; month and year precisely coded.  
1 This is the best estimation for fatalities.  
Source: UCDP; International Crisis Group; Anadolu Agency (AA) News; RFI Afrique; Daily Sabah News; Kabore 
(2008) 
 
The compiled list of communal violence in Mali highlights two points: first, communal 
conflicts between different land users are mainly seen in Mopti and Gao regions; and second, 
Fulani herders, with the exception of one incident, were involved in all of the violent clashes. It 
is not surprising that the resource-related disputes would be seen in Mopti and Gao regions 
(along the Niger river) as different livelihoods “cohabit and utilize” the same territory, putting 
pressure on the resources available (Straus 2011). However, this list does not speak for the 
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dynamics of these conflicts. While there are seven communal conflicts that had occurred in Mali, 
my findings conclude that the elements environmental stress and scarcity caused by climate 
change were only present in some of these conflicts (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Climate-related Communal Conflicts in Mali 
Clash Year Fatalities Est. Location Climate-
Related? 
Fulani - Salsalbe 1993 29 Mopti Region Yes 
Fulani - Tuareg 1997 34 Gao Region Yes 
Arab - Kunta 1999 59 Gao Region Uncertain7 
Dogon - Fulani 2012 40 Mopti Region Yes 
Fulani - Tuareg 2014 30 Gao Region Uncertain 
Fulani - Bambara 2016 30 Mopti Region No 
Fulani - Bambara 2017 30 Mopti Region No 
 
As I seek to understand under what conditions climate driven environmental stress could 
lead to communal conflict, in the following sections, I disregard the communal conflicts that 
were not relevant for climate-related discussions. In the next section, I first provide a short 
summary of the three climate-related conflicts to inform the reader about the context of these 
events. Then, I analyze these conflicts using the lenses of environmental security and political 
marginalization. 
 
Communal Conflict: Fulani Herders and Salsalbe Herders (1993) 
 The conflict between Fulani herders and herders from the villages of Sosobe and Salsalbe 
took place on 8 December 1993, in the Mopti region. The clash between the two producer groups 
left 29 dead and 42 wounded (Kobane 2008). The two land users have always had tensions 
between them due to the “contesting claims to a grazing territory” in Mopti region, dating back 
to colonial years (Moore et al. 1999:15). Fulani claimed that the territory belonged to them since 
the pre-colonial era, and that Salsalbe, together with other ethnic groups, were their Rimaibes 
(ancient slaves). Salsalbe herders, on the other hand, demanded that the authority to manage the 
land belonged to them as they have been the occupants of this area for many years.   
                                                          
7 Two conflicts – Arab/Kunta (1999) and Fulani/Tuareg (2014) are classified as uncertain as there is not a strong 
evidence to suggest that climate-related stressed played any role in these incidents.  
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Mopti region is highly demanded as it offers “some of the best remaining pastures for 
livestock and pastoralism” (Kobane 2008:38). Following the wet years of 1990s, the region saw 
an “increased demand for flood-recession land” by both farmers and herders (Kobane 2008:38). 
The variations in rainfall, required Fulanis to move north at a later time, at the beginning of the 
delayed rainy season. As a result, Fulanis remained longer by the flood-recession land and took 
advantage of the growing grasses in this zone (Moore et al. 1999). Fulanis’ extended stay in the 
area was not welcomed by Salsalbe herders, as they could not graze their own animals properly 
due to the presence of the Fulanis. This frustration between the groups turned into a violent 
clash.  
A local security expert stated that it is still common to see “people [getting] killed in 
disputes over access to the bourgoutieres8” to this day (Interview cited in the International Crisis 
Group 2016, para.16.).  Disputes like this among different land users have been also “aggravated 
by the lack of legal clarity regarding land rights” (International Crisis Group 2016, para.16). 
Information about who initiated the attack remains unknown; yet, what is certain is that these 
disputes have become increasingly more lethal “following the increased availability of weapons 
since the 1990s” (International Crisis Group 2016, para.16).  
 
Communal Conflict: Fulani Herders and Tuareg Herders (1997) 
 The violent clash between Fulani and Tuareg groups occurred on 5 July 1997 in the Gao 
region. Similar to the case of Fulani – Salsalbe conflict, Fulanis and Tuaregs had also ongoing 
tension prior to the clash. Historically, Fulani communities have been regular victims of attacks 
conducted by the Tuaregs (Chauzal and van Damme 2015). Following the 1984-85 drought, 
Tuaregs’ control over lands was decreasing (Stiles 1997). The environmental conditions during 
this period forced Tuareg herders to move their herds south or to sell them, and those that did not 
migrate fell into poverty. Tuareg were also excluded from other ethnic groups that had access to 
land and livestock trade. These groups were not only “intensifying livestock production and 
grazing to maximize profits,” but were also practicing an unsustainable production system 
(Johnson, Mayrand and Paquin 2006:49).  
At the same time, Fulani people perceived themselves as the victim of cattle theft, for 
which they held Tuaregs accountable. Following the signature of the National Pact in 1992, 
                                                          
8 The bourgoutieres are plains subject to flooding and are particularly fertile after floods.  
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which attempted to “establish a special status” for the northern region of Mali, Fulanis asked the 
government to be compensated for their losses. Fulanis have expressed similar demands for 
many times but none were fulfilled, “strengthening among the Fulanis the sense of impunity, 
injustice, and animosity toward to Tuareg nomadic communities with which they frequently 
compete for the control of the same territory” (International Crisis Group 2016, para.13). 
The tensions between these two groups finally erupted in 1992, but it is not known who 
initiated it. The clash resulted in the death of 34 people. While it is not known what kinds of 
tools were being used by both parties, one could expect that lethal weapons were involved in the 
clash. The availability of these weapons at the time, flowing in from Libya, and the number of 
fatalities, lead to making such an assumption.  
 
Communal Conflict: Dogon Farmers and Fulani Herders (2012) 
On 25 May 2012, Dogon farmers and Fulani herders clashed in Mopti region, leaving 40 
people dead, mostly Fulani men. According to local authorities, the conflict between Fulani 
herders and Dogon farmers of 2012 originated from an agreement between Mali and Burkina 
Faso, allowing Burkina herders to enter into Mali for pasture land (Reuters 2012: n.d.).  
Historically, Dogon farmers have resided in harsh environments, where drought, famines 
and localized floods hinder crop production and cause humanitarian crisis (Douny 2016). During 
the first half of the century, Dogon communities were exposed to successive periods of famine 
due to drought and floods. During the second half of the century, the droughts of 1973 and 1983-
84 destroyed millet production. The drought of 2012 and the political crisis in the country have 
further worsened resource scarcity and deteriorated the relationship between other communal 
groups. Dogon farmers were neither able to provide land for livestock grazing, nor interested in 
hosting Fulanis (Douny 2016). They also did not trust the Fulani, and “opposed the opening of 
[the] corridors” to them (Reuters 2012: n.d.). As Fulanis claimed the rights to access to the area, 
Dogon farmers decided to solve the issue by attacking the Fulani settlements, taking advantage 
of the lack of security presence in the area (International Crisis Group 2016). This also made it 
difficult for the Burkinabe government to address the issue as “[they did not] know what officials 
to talk to in the [border] area” (Chilson 2010: para.2). The attack “has remained unpunished, 
[playing] a direct role in the decision by nomad Fulani groups to arm themselves” (International 
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Crisis Group 2016, para.15). During the same year, some even decided to take part in the radical 
movements taking place in the Gao region.   
 
4.2.3. Case Analysis  
Involvement of the Fulani 
In all climate-related communal conflicts, Fulani people were present. Fulanis9 are 
considered as one of the largest ethnic groups in the region, and are present in all West African 
countries. Bruijn (2000) states that the Fulani identity is very ‘permeable’ in the sense that they 
are often treated as immigrants, despite having lived in the same location for many years. During 
the colonial era, social identities were constructed based on ethnicity and occupation. Hence, 
livelihoods and ethnic identities are strongly tied to one another, and pastoralists are commonly 
associated with the Fulani ethnic group in West Africa (Hussein 1998). 
The power relations between Fulani people and other ethnic groups have changed 
dramatically. Previous to colonial era, Fulanis had several empires, dominating different regions 
of today’s West Africa (Kirwin 2010). During this time, Malian society had adopted and 
implemented informal systems of land use and tenure that “supported the local production 
systems and encouraged herder-farmer relations in the process” (Davidheiser 2011:82). Yet, this 
customary system was undermined by the introduction of a new political system, property rights 
and land tenures, increasing herder-farmer incompatibility, and putting pressure on natural 
resources (Kirwin 2010). Such change in the system also had significant implications for conflict 
dynamics within the local level, as customary mechanisms for conflict management were 
eliminated (Davidheiser 2011). 
 
Environmental Context 
These conflicts were underlined and shaped by several structural conditions; yet, the 
changing climate has played an additional role in driving these incidents. Decrease in the 
availability of water, high-quality farmlands and other precious resources, due to drought, 
irregular rainfall patterns and unreliable climatic conditions, have all forced herders to migrate 
into farming lands and aggravated the competition between different land users (Straus 2011). 
The long-term effects of drought, together with the expansion of agricultural zone, have 
                                                          
9 Fulani people are also identified as: Fula, Silimisa, Sosobe, Pulaar, Fulbe, Wodabe and Borroro. 
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“eliminated perennial grasses in the northern zone and substantially reduced their abundance” 
across much of the central and southern zones as well (Brottem 2016:554).  
In these incidents, each land user had grievances with the other party. Pastoralists felt 
frustration as practices and resources that ensure their survival were being threatened by the 
changing weather patterns and the expansion of agricultural zones. By the same token, farmers 
distrusted herders, and were not willing to share the already decreasing resources. These 
ecological borders also represented ethnic and cultural borders. “They [became] lines of 
demarcation, where people [met] to co-operate or to fight” (Tremolieres 2013:63). The notion of 
scarcity was not exclusively a physical concept, but also a socially constructed one. In this sense, 
“vulnerability to environmental conditions [was entangled with other] social and political forces” 
(Watts 2012:3).  
 
Political Context 
The new political scheme introduced by the French regime replaced the traditional 
systems and promoted inequality by favoring certain ethnic groups at the expense of others. 
Since the French took control over the region, both the colonial and post-colonial governments in 
Mali mistrusted the ‘primitive’ nomadic communities, such as Fulani, Tuaregs and Arabs, and 
attempted to settle them. Pastoral groups were seen as “‘the other,’ the inhabitant of the 
wilderness, not belonging to civilization” (Bruijn, Beek and Dijk, n.d.:61). Their livelihoods 
were portrayed as obstacles to progression, urbanization and modernization; and as incompatible 
with the ideals of a strong and developed nation (Holthuijzen 2011). Despite the historical 
evidence that mobile livestock systems in the Sahel have shown “high adaptive capacity and 
ecological economic efficiency,” land tenure reforms have disregarded these facts and 
emphasized for agriculture expansion (Watts 2012:3). This could be explained by the fact that 
“most of the senior leadership of post-colonial Mali were drawn from the southern ethnic groups, 
who were not sympathetic to the pastoral culture of the … nomads” (Douglas-Bowers 2013, 
para.4). Farmers, on the other hand, were praised, and their traditional agricultural methods were 
treated as the golden ticket to development and growth. As a result, pastoral groups were 
“sedentarized” by various reforms (Holthuijzen 2011:252).  
This shift from mobility to “sedentism” have led to marginalization of many pastoralist 
communities (Brooks 2006:4). It has exacerbated these communities’ vulnerability in the face of 
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changing environmental conditions as their coping mechanism - their mobility - was taking away 
from them. It also created a significant discrepancy within balance of power, which played an 
important role in decreasing pastoral people’s access to land for production (Davidheiser 2011). 
As Frantz (1975) states: 
 
“The more rapid incorporation of farming peoples into the 
developing larger political systems resulted in decreasing control of 
land and cattle among the pastoralists – this, at a time when rapid 
growth in the agricultural, commercial, and industrial sectors had 
generated a larger volume of competition and conflict over basic 
natural resources” (p.14).  
 
In addition to sedentarizing pastoral communities, key aspects of land reforms introduced 
by Europeans aimed at privatizing and nationalizing the land (Davidheiser 2011:83). These 
policies significantly limited the control and use of land by indigenous populations, while 
contributing to environmental degradation. These “exclusive property regimes” have 
continuously resulted in the “overuse of the resource base, amplification of negative effects of 
drought periods, and increased conflict between nomads and farmers, among nomadic groups, 
and within nomadic groups” (Van den Brink, Bromley and Chavas 1995:392; Davidheiser 
2011:83). Some of these policies and reforms, such as nationalization of land, had begun during 
the colonial era, but then continued after independence under the authority of the southern elites. 
This was particularly harsh for the pastoral communities as territories that were important for the 
transhumant Fulani production system were claimed by the ruling governments (Davidheiser 
2011).  
However, most post-colonial governments failed to nationalize land effectively in many 
rural areas in Mali. This, combined with the newly introduced land tenure arrangements, 
favoring agriculture over pastoralism, “created situations of legal pluralism,” defined as “the 
coexistence and interaction of multiple legal orders such as state [and] customary laws, all of 
which provide basis for claiming property rights” (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001, in Brottem 
2013:72). The uncertainty created by these measures “came to characterize most of the regional 
agro-pastoral zone” (Brottem 2013:73). Since pastoralists did not have the legal resources to be 
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compensated for the disappearance of their grazing lands, they “began relying on extra-legal 
strategies such as bribery to gain protection and favorable judgements from higher-level 
authorities in ways that exacerbate conflicts with farmers” (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009 in Brottem 
2013:73).  
The expansion of agriculture following the wet periods in 1950s and 1960s “pushed 
pastoralists into more marginal regions and led to a breakdown in the networks connecting 
herders and farmers, further contributing to conflict” between these different land users (Brooks 
2011:4). This, combined with the marginalization of pastoral communities, had disastrous effects 
when severe droughts hit during the early 1970s. Lives and livestock were loss, communities and 
livelihood systems were destroyed, and social disruption was triggered on a regional scale. These 
extreme weather events undoubtedly played a role in changing the social dynamics for the worse, 
but inappropriate development practices enforced by the colonial and post-colonial regimes were 
also just as responsible (Brooks 2011).  
For instance, since the early 1970s, several development projects have been implemented 
in the Mopti region. The Office Riz Mopti (ORM), funded by the World Bank, was established 
“as a part of a large national initiative aiming at increasing agricultural production” 
(Benjaminsen et al. 2012:105). The focus of the ORM was to convert unused land into rice fields 
(casier rizicole) and to build irrigation systems for water distribution. However, these ‘vacant’ 
lands were in fact burgu lands, traditionally belonging to the pastoral communities. Since these 
lands were not flooded due to the droughts in the 1970s, the ORM regarded them as 
“underutilized and transformed [them] into rice fields” (Benjaminsen et al. 2012:106). The ORM 
projects are clear illustrations of how land reforms and policies have favored agriculture and 
discriminated against pastoralism (Benjaminsen et al. 2012). As one herder from the Mopti 
region said: “I don’t know if the ORM benefited the farmers, but I know one thing: it destroyed 
the land of the herders!” (Benjaminsen et al. 2012:107).  
Furthermore, since the 1990s, there was also an expansion of ethnic-based cultural 
associations, which had an important role for conflict resolution at the local level. These 
associations were created with the aim of connecting the local structures with the central 
government, headed by the urban elites and organized along ethnic lines. Tabital Pulaaku, for 
instance, is one of these organizations in the Mopti region representing the Fulani communities. 
In the face of the changing environment and discriminatory land policies, many Fulani elites 
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requested Tabital Pulaaku “to organize a response [to the growing tension with other groups], 
including the creation of self-defense groups” (International Crisis Group 2016, para.22). These 
elites encouraged their constituencies to “take up arms to defend themselves and gain the respect 
of the government and rival communities” (International Crisis Group 2016, para.22).  
 In 2001, the Malian government passed the Pastoral Charter, which is “a legislation 
regulating access to pastoral resources” (Cotula 2007:89). The Charter intended to give the 
authority to manage natural resources to the local communities; however, it failed to fulfill its 
mandate as it had several weaknesses. First, the formulation of the programmes and legislative 
text did not include the voice of the herders. It neglected the needs of the pastoral sector, 
especially in the north, and allowed “the bourgoutieres, which were important grazing lands, to 
be converted into rice fields” (IIED 2004:71). Secondly, the Charter was intended to provide 
guidelines; instead “it has become a detailed code, allowing very little flexibility for adjustment 
to local circumstances” (IIED 2004:71). It was further criticized for having provisions that are 
more appropriate for sedentarized farmers, paying “little attention … to the mobility or the 
instability and uncertainty of the state of natural resources in dry pastoral areas” (Cotula 
2007:91). Moreover, Mali has several dozens of decrees, codes and laws that govern natural 
resources administration. Not only these create confusion within the local communities, but the 
lack of education of the local people also makes it difficult to implement the legislation.  
 At last, the extent of Fulani representation within the government is not clear; however, 
there are studies suggesting that they were not well represented, along with other non-majority 
ethnic groups (Gaines et al. n.d.; Smith 2014). The Malian political scene has been dominated by 
the Bambara elites, who have long felt resentment towards the pastoral communities of Tuaregs, 
Fulanis and Arabs. Following the independence, the Malian authorities have tried to repress 
these non-majority ethnic groups through policies that ensured political and economic 
marginalization of these communities. The post-colonial regimes have ignored the needs and 
wishes of pastoralists, and made no effort “to incorporate [them] into government roles” (Gaines 
et al. n.d.:16). Even the police forces that were assigned to particular localities were not 
representative of the local population (International Crisis Group 2016). Lack of representation 
and discriminatory land tenure policies all contributed to the increased vulnerability of these 
groups in the face of climate change. 
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4.2.4. Conclusion 
Mali has been exposed to harsh and unreliable climatic conditions, and it has witnessed to 
many changes within its land management systems. The French rule left a legacy that included a 
production system in which agriculture was praised and livestock was dismissed. These 
discriminatory practices have pushed pastoral communities to marginal lands and decreased their 
capacities to maintain their livelihoods in the face of changing weather patterns.  
The contexts in which communal conflicts occurred have consisted of resource 
competition among different groups and perception of sense of injustice, while involving 
politically marginalized Fulani people. The decrease in the availability of natural resources, in 
part due to climate change, has increased competition among different communities. Changes in 
the climatic patterns have disrupted the ‘production calendars’ of both farmers and pastoralists, 
and played a role in the expansion of crop yields. The decline in the access to natural resources 
due to land tenure policies, favoring agriculture at the expense of livestock production, led the 
Fulanis to perceive themselves as the victim of the others’ actions. These dynamics have created 
tensions among different land user groups, and resulted in violent clashes.  
On the other hand, the role of the Fulani elite in mobilizing its communities is not well 
established. Findings suggest that these elites had made several attempts to encourage their 
groups to defend their livelihoods. Yet, to what extent these attempts played a role in these 
communal conflicts remains uncertain. While this uncertainty suggests that more in-depth 
research is needed to fill in this gap; the implications of it is that it obstructs me from 
establishing a causal relationship between my variables, hindering the strength of this research.  
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4.3. Burkina Faso 
 Burkina Faso is a semi-arid, landlocked country (area: 274,200 square kilometres), 
bordering Mali to the west and north. The Sahelian ecosystem is present in the north, whereas the 
southern part of the country falls within the Sudanian ecosystem (Kagone, 2017). As one of the 
smallest economies in the world, agriculture in Burkina Faso involves 80 percent of the active 
population, accounting for almost 40 percent of the entire GDP (Traore 2013). Yet, Burkina Faso 
is still considered as “the lowest performing agricultural country in Africa” (The World Bank 
Group n.d.:1).  
 Burkina Faso has a population of 19,512,533 (July 2016 est.), and an annual growth rate 
of 3.01 percent (CIA 2017). The country consists of thirteen administrative divisions and 
approximately sixty different groups. The main ones include Mossi (52.5 percent of the 
population); Fulani (8.4 percent); Gurma (6.8 percent); Bobo (4.8 percent); Senoufo (4.4 
percent); Bissa (3.9 percent); Tuareg (3.3 percent); Lobi (2.5 percent); and the remaining is made 
up of other minor ethnic groups (CIA 2017; Kagone 2017). 
 
Figure 14. Burkina Faso’ Administrative Divisions and Ethnic Groups 
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Source: The Joshua Project (n.d.) 
 
4.3.1. Climate Change and Burkina Faso 
 Similar to Mali, Burkina Faso is also vulnerable to climate change due to its limited 
natural resources, dense population, poverty and dependence on agriculture for food security and 
economic opportunities (Climate Change Knowledge Portal 2017). Burkina Faso ranks 185 out 
of 188 in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report 
due to its fragility to extreme weather events, together with other factors (UNDP 2017). Decrease 
in rainfall is followed by dust storms and temperature spikes, which have immediate effects on 
food supplies and yields (Climate Change Knowledge Portal 2017).  
During the period of 1991 and 2009, eleven major floods and three major droughts have 
been recorded, affecting 479,493 people (USAID 2012). Drought remains as the “most frequent 
external shock to food security” in Burkina Faso as extreme fluctuations in rainfall and 
temperature disrupts cereal production (USAID 2012:12). In addition to drought, Burkina Faso is 
also susceptible to flash floods, wind storms and outbreaks of diseases (Figure 15) (Climate 
Change Knowledge Portal 2017). Flash floods have increased during the rainy seasons in the 
central and northern parts of the country (USAID 2012).  
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Figure 15. Natural Hazard Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Climate Change Knowledge Portal (2017) 
 
Frequent flooding, particularly in 1988, 1992, 1994 and 1999, has severely affected 
certain areas. For instance, the flooding of 1992 had resulted in the loss of agricultural 
production of CFA Franc 1.803 billion, while in 1994 the loss was equivalent to CFA Franc 
63,937,680,000 (The World Bank Group n.d.). The floods in 1994 were immediately followed 
by a drought, which destroyed the initial production of maize in the Haut Plateau and northern 
regions.   
  
Temperature and Rainfall Variations 
 Since the early 1900s, dry regions of Burkina Faso have expanded towards the south 
(World Bank 2011; UNFCCC 2001). This period has also witnessed an increase in average 
monthly temperature of around +0.6oC (Figure 16), and it is further expected to rise by 1.7oC by 
2050 (The World Bank Group n.d.). These dry conditions are usually seen between the months 
of November and December when humidity level averages 10 percent, and in the northern part of 
the country where rain is only available during two months out of the year (Climate Change 
Knowledge Portal 2017). Rainfall, on the other hand, has seen an overall decrease and it is 
expected to drop further by 3.4 percent by 2025, and 7.3 percent by 2050. It is also predicted that 
such decrease in rainfall will be accompanied by “very strong seasons and inter-annual 
variability of climatic factors” (The World Bank Group n.d.:2). 
 
 
 
 
48 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
Figure 16. Average Monthly Temperature and Rainfall Changes (1901-2015) 
 
      (1901 – 1930)              (1931 – 1960)  
 
      (1961 – 1990)         (1991 – 2015)   
Source: Climate Change Knowledge Portal (2017).   
  
These fluctuations in temperature and rainfall are expected to have detrimental impacts 
on the water, agriculture as well as livestock sectors, especially since Burkina Faso lacks the 
capacity to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Water resources will more likely to be 
polluted due to floods, and evaporation will be aggravated due to increased temperature. 
Furthermore, crops and livestock will be lost, agricultural calendars will be disrupted, production 
will drop and food insecurity will increase (The World Bank Group n.d.).  
 Food security in Burkina Faso heavily depends on the land and water. Highly variable 
climate, recurring droughts, dust storms and unreliable rainfall patterns all pose a threat to the 
availability of these natural resources, putting a great risk on the livelihoods of the people. 
Burkina Faso is also suffering from poor soil, with little nutrients and a low water-holding 
capacity (Climate Change Knowledge Portal 2017). As such, extreme fluctuations in the weather 
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immediately affect food supplies and yields. Although the country has been receiving continuous 
foreign aid, ensuring food security remains an ongoing problem. 
 
Changes in Land Use Patterns 
 The growing population in Burkina Faso, with an annual rate of 3.01 percent, has put 
greater pressure on natural resources and demanded a greater expansion of agriculture 
production. The size of the arable land has almost doubled since the 1960s (Figure 17). This, in 
return, meant increased deforestation and depletion of the vegetation through overgrazing, which 
leads to further resource stress. The expansion of agricultural land also meant decrease in the 
availability of grazing areas (USAID 2012). As agriculture production is expanding, areas 
available for livestock is shrinking, making it difficult for pastoral groups to maintain and secure 
their livelihoods.   
 
Figure 17. Agricultural Land in Burkina Faso (1961-2014) 
Source: FAO (2017).  
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4.3.2. Fulanis and Pastoral Communities in Burkina Faso  
Fulani People 
Fulani people make up the second largest ethnic group after the Mossis – almost 10 
percent of the population. Among non-Fulani communities, Fulanis are divided into two separate 
groups: settled and foreigner. The former refers to those that look after the livestock of local 
sedentary groups, while the latter is used for long distance herders (transhumant) (Kirwin 2010). 
Similar to Mali, and West Africa in general, farmers in Burkina Faso use the terms herder and 
Fulani interchangeably. This linkage can be seen within the Fulani population as well. They, too, 
feel their identity to be the strongest when they are engaged in activities specific to their 
occupation. Interviews conducted by Kirwin (2010) shows that Fulani people feel ‘as a Fulani’ 
the most when they: 
 
“… hold [their] cattle herding stick and wear [their] scarf.” 
“During the periods when [their] cattle sell for a lot of money.” 
“…they are with their cattle.” 
(Kirwin 2010:34).  
 
During the Sankara era (1983-1987), the demonym for the country was changed from 
Voltaique to Burkinabe. The term Voltaique had negative connotations and it did not generate the 
strong national identity the government wanted to establish. The new term Burkinabe, not only 
avoided femininity and masculinity, but it was also strategically constructed in a way to 
represent the Fulani identity. The be in the term reflects how Fulani people refer to themselves – 
as Fulbe (Kuba 2003).  
 Despite the efforts of creating a strong national identity, and a political system 
representative of the ethnic composition of the population, Fulani people have assumed lower 
political profile since the end of the colonial era (Diallo 2008). They have not been appointed to 
high level representatives in the national government, although they make up the second largest 
ethnic group in the country. There are suspicions towards Fulanis, and pastoralists in general, as 
they frequently travel across regional and national borders. Due to their livelihood, pastoralists 
are associated with illegal activities that involve smuggling of good or stealing cattle (Tonah 
2002). As such, they are often subject to unflattering terms, such as dishonest and untrustworthy.  
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Pastoral Communities 
Competition between different land users do exists in Burkina Faso, especially over 
limited natural resources. Land-related conflicts could generally be seen among: (1) herders and 
farmers; (2) intra-familial; (3) autochthones and immigrants; and (4) among herders (Zongo 
2009). Rural areas often experience land-use disputes between pastoralists and farmers. 
However, interestingly these have not translated into violent clashes among or within groups. In 
this sense, Burkina Faso is considered as a relatively peaceful country; especially compared to its 
neighbors.  
Following the colonial era, governments and political leaders have taken carefully 
calculated steps to lessen divisions along ethnic and religious lines in Burkina Faso. Charles 
(2003) concludes that “Burkina is one of the rare cases, if not the only case, where a majority 
ethnic group, Mossi (farmers) has not monopolized the command of the central apparatuses and 
has not put itself in a position of complete domination” (Charles 2003 in Kirwin 2010:24). These 
findings are significant; but they should be approached with caution. The lack of Mossi 
monopoly within the political domain does not suggest that the assignments indeed reflected the 
ethnic composition of the country. As mentioned earlier, certain ethnic groups, in particular the 
Fulani, had never been appointed for high level positions within the government. 
Moreover, despite the efforts of the post-colonial governments to incorporate Fulanis into 
the national identity, farmers have enjoyed the priority within the land tenure systems in Burkina 
Faso (Marty 1993). Implemented first by the colonial regime, the land tenure system, giving 
sedentary groups the power to decide who gets the land, continues to exist to date. Pastoral 
communities are not, and have not been, given the authority to dictate the land usage. As a result, 
farmers “control rights over pastures, while pastoral authorities are obliged to only enforce 
activities in their communities” (Kirwin 2010:40). The opinions of the pastoral people have not 
been considered for the issues of land management and allocation (Ngaido 1994).   
The colonial regime had put a great emphasis on expanding the agricultural production. 
Animal husbandry was still included in the newly established production model; yet, it was 
intended to complement the agriculture rather than being considered as a productive resource on 
its own (Kirwin 2010). Similar to the case of Mali, national authorities considered pastoralist 
livelihood to be incompatible with the ideals of modernization (Diallo 2008). This agricultural 
model had also created new property rights to provide security and to encourage investment 
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(Breusers 2003). As a result, “the rights of herders, compared to [that of] farmers, were 
circumscribed and their occupational livelihood was threatened” (Kirwin 2010:41).  Post-
colonial governments in Burkina Faso have more or less continued with these ‘colonial policies’. 
Farmers have been considered as the righteous owners of the land, and pastoralists have been 
regarded as people wasting land resources. The expansion of agriculture, especially by Mossi 
farmers, has made it more challenging for Fulani to access to pasture and water resources. An 
elderly Fulani claimed that: 
 
“Mossi [farmers] are people who destroy the brousse. Everywhere 
they cut trees to make their fields. They prevent us from having 
space and pastures for our cattle. But if there is no brousse, a 
[Fulani] cannot live, the brousse is life” (Breusers, Nederlof and 
van Rheenen 1998:362).  
 
As part of the land tenure reform, the post-colonial regimes have implemented several 
donor-funded projects. One of these is the Gestion des terroirs (GdT) funded by the World Bank, 
UNDP and several other organizations (Kirwin 2010). Such an initiative aims to address the 
issues of land development and management on the local level, by involving local people. In 
2007, as part of the GdT, a new initiative was introduced, Commission villageoise de 
development (CVD), which primarily concerns resource management and conflict resolution. 
One of the key purposes of the CVD is to minimize conflicts over land usage through negotiation 
and establishing land use zones. Within this framework, village communities are granted the 
authority to determine the eligibility for common property usage (Batterbury 1998). While this 
system was implemented to create a harmony among different land users, it is found to be 
“conflictual and sometimes [resulting] in the exclusion of some groups” (Kirwin 2010:63). 
Fulani people, in particular, hardly benefit from the system in place (McCay 2002). In fact, 
Marty (1993) points out that the very meaning of the gestion des terroirs, in the literal sense, is 
discriminatory. The term ‘terroir’ refers to village boundaries, which are established and 
practiced by farmers. This concept does not allow for consideration of other livelihoods which 
require more than one territory. Herders, in this sense, do not fit into this framework.  
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4.3.3. Conclusion   
Extreme weather conditions, and unreliable climatic patterns have created unpleasant 
conditions for many people whose livelihoods are dependent on natural resources. As in the case 
of Mali, these climatic changes have reduced the availability of resources to an extent, disrupted 
the production calendars of different producer groups and led to competition among different 
communities, such as farmers and pastoralists. Livelihoods are strongly attached to the ethnic 
identity of individuals; hence, the Fulanis have become one of the main actors in this competition 
for land and water.  
The French rule left a similar legacy in Burkina Faso, in which newly introduced land 
management systems have interrupted the existing customary systems, and favored agriculture 
production at the expense of pastoralism. The lifestyle of the Fulani was seen as an obstacle for 
modernization; hence, these new policies attempted to sedentarize pastoral communities. Those 
that did not adopt a sedentary lifestyle were pushed to marginal lands and excluded from the 
political considerations further.  
Despite these factors - competition for resources, feelings of exclusion and injustice - 
Burkina Faso has maintained its low-conflict profile. Clashes among different producer groups 
could be observed every day; yet, these have not turned into violence conflicts. The case analysis 
of Burkina Faso suggests that political marginalization is not the answer to the question of why 
communal conflict has not been observed in the country. The elite role in Burkina Faso in 
unifying the society appears to be different than in Mali; however, there is not sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the role of the elite is the answer. The data that explicitly identifies the 
decisions of and steps taken by the elite simply does not exist. Based on the available data, one 
could find a correlation between the role of the elite in mobilizing its communities and the 
occurrence of violent clashes; yet, more information is needed to establish a causal relationship 
between the two.  
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4.4. Case Comparison: Mali and Burkina Faso 
Mali and Burkina Faso share many similarities. Besides their geographical location, both 
countries were once part of the French empire, have politically marginalized Fulani ethnic 
groups, and are highly vulnerable to climate change due to their low development levels and 
heavy dependence on natural resources, such as land and water, for food security and economic 
opportunities.  
The climate change vulnerability monitor provided by the HCSS (Figure 18) assesses 
countries’ vulnerabilities to climate change. It incorporates three different dimensions in its 
calculation: vulnerability to weather-relates disasters; vulnerability to sea level rises; and 
vulnerability to loss of agricultural production (See Annex 3 and 4). Since both Mali and Burkina 
Faso are landlocked countries, sea level rise is not a primary concern for either of them. As such, 
inclusion of the sea level factor into the calculations does not significantly change the overall 
climate change vulnerability index for any one of these countries. There is a 0.03-point 
difference between the vulnerability of Mali and Burkina Faso. According to the monitor, Mali is 
slightly more vulnerable (0.16) to climate change than Burkina Faso (0.13). However, both 
countries are still considered to be highly vulnerable to changes in climate patterns – from 
extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts, to variations in rainfall and temperature. 
 
Figure 18. Climate Change Vulnerability (Mali and Burkina Faso) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Climate Change Vulnerability Monitor, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS) (2017).  
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These two West African countries also suffer from low human development capacity 
assessed by the Human Development Report (HDR) by the UNDP (2016) (Figure 19). This 
assessment is developed using five key indicators: The Human Development Index (HDI); the 
Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI); the Gender Development Index (GDI); 
the Gender Inequality Index (GII); and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) (UNDP 
2016).10  
 
Figure 19. Human Development Report  
Source: UNDP (2016).  
 
Table 5 provides a comparison of these key indicators in Mali and Burkina Faso. As the 
table itself suggests, both countries are placed almost at the bottom of the of the UNDP’s human 
development assessment, and the values assigned for each country are relatively close to one 
another.  
 
Table 5. HDR Country Comparison 
 HDR Rank 
(out of 188) 
HDI Value IHDI Value GDI Value GII Value MPI Value 
Mali 175 0.442 0.293 n/a  0.689 0.456 
Burkina Faso 185 0.402 0.267 n/a 0.615 0.508 
Source: UNDP (2016). 
 
                                                          
10 See Annex 5 for country score for each indicator and their sub-values.  
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Furthermore, Mali and Burkina Faso heavily depend on the land to sustain livelihoods. 
Land and water resources are the primary sources for food security and economic opportunities 
for many communities. As briefly discussed earlier, over 80 of the total population in both 
countries engage in agricultural practices, including agriculture, fishing, hunting and forestry 
(World Bank Data 2015). These practices together contribute over 35 percent to the GDP of each 
country (Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Agricultural Production in Mali and Burkina Faso 
 Total 
Population 
(in million) 
Rural 
Population 
(% of total) 
Agricultural 
population 
(in % of total) 
Population Density Agricultural 
value added 
(% of GDP) 
(People 
per 
km2) 
(Agr. 
pop. Per 
arable 
land* 
km2) 
Mali 17,599.69 60 74 13 197 40.3 
Burkina Faso 18,105.57 70 92 61.8 261 35.7 
* FAO defines arable land as “land under temporary crops, temporary meadows for moving or for pasture, land 
under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow.”  
Source: World Bank Data (2015); FAO. (1 2016 / 2,3,4,5,6,7 2005) 
 
These numbers signify the importance of the agricultural production for the survival of 
individuals and communities. They also explain the high vulnerability of Mali and Burkina Faso 
to climate change. The fertility of the soil in part depends on climatic patterns. Significant shifts 
in these patterns could have, and have had, detrimental impacts for agriculture and livestock 
production in these countries.  
Moreover, the primary actor in the communal conflicts in Mali was the Fulani people. In 
all of these circumstances, they felt that their livelihoods were being threatened in part due to 
climate change, and in part due to political marginalization they have been exposed to. The 
Fulani communities have experienced similar dynamics in Burkina Faso as well. Although post-
colonial governments attempted to incorporate the Fulani identity into the national identity, they 
disregarded the concerns and needs to the Fulani communities in the years after. As such, Fulani 
people have experienced political marginalization, which further exacerbated their vulnerability 
to changing climate patterns.  
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Despite these common features, none of the factors able to sufficiently explain the lack of 
communal conflict in Burkina Faso. These features could in theory exacerbate the ongoing 
tensions within the society; however, within the scope of this study, they appear to have low 
significance for conflict dynamics. In the next section, I display my findings and explore the 
factors that might explain how communal conflicts could occur within the context of climate 
change. 
 
  
58 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
4.5. Exploring the Truth: Why No Communal Conflict in Burkina Faso? 
In an attempt the study the relationship between political marginalization and communal 
conflict within the context of climate change, my findings do not provide enough evidence 
neither to support my hypothesis, nor to reject it. The concept of political marginalization does 
not sufficiently explain the variation in the dependent variable in my cases.  
Through my case analysis, I have discovered that all variables and mechanisms, except 
one, are present in both countries. In Burkina Faso, mobilization by the elite is not present as a 
mechanism. The role of the elite in Mali seems to contrast the attitude and the behavior of those 
in Burkina Faso. In both countries, the Fulani populations have been exposed to climate-driven 
environmental stress and political marginalization. In Mali, these dynamics were accompanied 
by competition for natural resources, feelings of injustice, and elite encouragement for 
mobilization. In the face of increasing vulnerability of the Fulani due to the climatic events and 
political decisions, Fulani elites were found to be encouraging their communities to gain the 
authority and respect they ‘deserve’.  
Burkina Faso, on the other hand, shares the same characteristics, except the role of the 
elite was different. Following the end of the colonial era, Burkinabe elites have focused on 
unifying the nation, as opposed to using the ethnic card to gain political support. The idea of 
nepotism was against the ideals of creating a strong national identity; thus, the elite avoided 
using ethnicity in political discussions.  
Still, there is not enough evidence to confidently argue that the elite role is the key factor 
explaining the lack of communal conflict in Burkina Faso. This requires me to study other 
factors that might connect climate change and communal conflict. For this purpose, in the 
following section, I explore other potential factors that could explain the variation in the 
dependent variable.  
 
4.5.1. Other Potential Factors 
 Identifying every potential conflict factor is a challenging task as these factors interact 
with other physical, social, political and economic dimensions in many ways.  However, 
throughout my research, I was able to detect several factors that might provide some insight for 
why communal conflicts were not experienced in Burkina Faso. It is important to note that these 
additional factors should not be seen as definitive answers to the differences between Mali and 
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Burkina Faso. Instead, they should be considered as areas to be explored further in future studies 
to better understand their implications for climate-conflict dynamics.   
 
Interpersonal Trust 
Interpersonal trust is a form of social capital. Such a trust could lay the foundation for 
civilian agency, which could influence individuals’ attitude towards violence, and “lead to 
actions that mitigate and restrain violent” in the context of tension (Krause 2016:282). Measuring 
this trust is not an easy task as groups might portray different images within the public and non-
public contexts. However, personal accounts could display how interpersonal trust plays out in 
avoiding violence.  
The interpersonal trust between the Fulani and other groups are different in Mali and 
Burkina Faso. In Mali, Fulani people perceive themselves as victims and “see taking up modern 
weapons as a way to challenge existing hierarchies, and to contest the privileges of urban elites 
and traditional local aristocracies” (International Crisis Group 2016, para.2). In fact, Fulani 
people believe that racism is still strong in Mali and Fulanis are seen as a category apart” (Botte 
and Schmitz 1994, in International Crisis Group 2016, para.20). As such, some elites believe that 
the Fulani should stand up for their rights with whatever means necessary.  
Farmers, on the other hand, do not trust the Fulani because of their perceived affiliation 
with the radical militant groups. Although Fulani public figures have been emphasizing that 
Fulani people are not terrorists, the Fulanis have become increasingly aware of the implication of 
their ethnic identity. Additionally, farmers generally feel that they are continuously being 
wronged by the Fulani. Fulani people never take the responsibility for damaging the crops, yet 
alone compensate farmers for it. For instance, an elderly farmer from the central region of Mali 
once stated: “you can know a Fulani [herder] for one hundred years and he still will not pay you 
if he damages your crops” (Brottem 2016: 553). Another farmer also experienced crop loss due 
to damages caused by a herder, whom was hosted by the family for over 25 years. Despite he 
acknowledged his fault, he still failed to compensate the family. According to several farmers, it 
is for this reason that they are “unwilling to accommodate herders’ access needs to changing 
resources” (Brottem 2016:553). 
In Burkina Faso, however, the picture is different. The interpersonal trust between the 
Fulanis and farmers seems stronger and their relationship appears to be more cooperative - only 
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within non-public discourse. Especially, the relationship between Fulanis and Mossi farmers, the 
largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso, can be seen as an example of this bond. These two groups 
have an “institutionalized friendship relations” known as zoodo (Breusers et al. 1998:368). Mossi 
is known for entrusting their cattle to Fulani. While cattle are an important element of this bond, 
the trust between Fulani and Mossi extends “beyond the domain of cattle and …purely economic 
exchanges” (Breusers et al. 1998:369). Inter-marriages between the two groups can often be 
found in Burkina Faso.  
However, these practices of trust take place privately. In their publicly employed 
discourse, Mossi farmers say and do what their identity requires – cropping millet and 
denigrating the Fulani – to “show a common front” with their community (Breusers et al. 
1998:370). Those that share ‘zoodo’ with the Fulani, still depict Fulani people “as not to be 
trusted, likely to be thieves, physically weak, disrespectful of any authority and uncivilized 
people of the bush” (Breusers et al. 1998:369). Some even go as far as to say: “it would be better 
to eat your money than to entrust your cow you bought to a [Fulani], as there will always come a 
moment when the [Fulani] comes to tell you that your cow is dead” (Breusers et al. 1998:369). 
This dichotomy in the attitude and behavior of the Mossi indeed shows the “externalization of 
tensions internal to the Mossi community” (Kirwin 2010:35). Among the Mossi, cattle 
ownership is an indicator of one’s wealth. Those that can afford cattle feel the need to hide their 
assets from their fellow villagers to prevent being “cursed” by them (Breusers et al. 1998:370). 
Thus, the interaction between the two groups observed in public domains does not speak for the 
nature of their bond. As one villager indicated: 
 
“We Mossi and Fulbe, do insult one another, harshly even, but 
each knows of the other that these are only false insults, only [a 
theatre]. In reality, we do understand one another very well. The 
insults serve to avoid arousing suspicion with the others” (a Mossi 
cited in Breusers et al. 1998:370).  
 
The existence of such a bond between Mossi and Fulani does not suggest that there are no 
conflicts. Climate change has impacted the natural resources that both groups depend on for 
survival, and Fulani still experience political marginalization in Burkina Faso. However, the 
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significance of this interpersonal trust between the two ethnically different producer groups is 
that it might play a role in influencing people’s perception towards violence and their 
participation in violent clashes with one another. 
 
Associational Life 
 Associational life can be considered as another form of social capital and it is frequently 
referred to in discussions about violent conflict mitigation. In his research in India, Varshney 
(2001) concludes that “everyday engagement between individuals and face to face interaction is 
sufficient to preclude the outbreak of violent conflict (pp.392). Similarly, Brass (1997) suggests 
that violent conflict could be prevented by engaging in extra-communal relations.  
 In Burkina Faso, especially Fulani women and women from farming communities share a 
strong economic relationship, which is reinforced through market activities, informal exchanges 
of goods and services, and celebrations (Hagberg 1998). Groups that do have inter-ethnic 
relations within social, economic and religious domains could and still do come into conflict 
with each other (Hagberg 1998). However, such clash does not turn into a violent conflict 
because the social capital, built upon associational life and interpersonal trust, outweighs the 
ethnic hostility.  
In Mali, on the other hand, this appears to be the other way around. Beeler (2006) finds 
that “in-group social capital (Dogon and Dogon) helps resolve conflicts, [while] out-group 
(Dogon and Fulani) social capital is trumped by ethnicity” (in Kirwin 2010:88). As a result, a 
farmer does not tolerate a damage done by a Fulani, despite having personal relations with that 
individual. Meanwhile, damage caused by an individual from the same ethnic group does not 
lead to an escalation due to the shared ethnic bond and linkages.  
 Both associational life and interpersonal trust are cited for their potential for mitigating 
conflicts among different groups. A field work conducted in Burkina Faso by Kirwin (2010) 
finds that both forms of social capital have shown “diminishing effect on an individual’ support 
for violence” (pp.164). This is insightful as it offers additional potential explanations for the 
different dynamics in the country. However, in order to confidently conclude that associational 
life is significant for conflict mitigation, more in-depth research is needed in both of these 
countries. 
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Sense of National Unity 
In societies that are composed of diverse race, religion and ethnicities, it is common to 
see the “placement of certain groups into the category of the ‘other’” (Brewer 2001:17). Such 
categorization makes ‘the other’ “vulnerable to varying degrees of distrust, prejudice, hatred, and 
demonization,” which makes their exclusion “from one’s own moral community” easier (Kelman 
2005, para.1). This moral exclusion then facilitates the “social and economic discrimination” of 
‘the other’ (Kelman 2005, para.1). While there could be many reasons for such a categorization, 
the key component remains as the “perception of the out-group as a threat to one’s own group’s 
interests, status, or identity” (Kelman 2001:192-193).  
 In order to minimize violent conflicts from occurring and to offer opportunities for 
reconciliation, these diverse identities within the society need to be harmonized. As discussed 
earlier, there was an attempt to create a unified national identity in Burkina Faso. During his 
presidency, Thomas Sankara (1983-1987), changed the demonym for the country from Voltaique 
to Burkinabe to symbolize a new beginning for his country. This was seen necessary to create a 
strong national identity and a sense of unity among the people. The new name, Burkinabe, was 
constructed very carefully to ensure that it was gender-neutral and represented different ethnic 
groups, including the Fulani. The be at the end represents the Fulani identity – as in Fulbe (Kuba 
2003).  
 Mali, on the other hand, had a different approach in creating a unified national identity. 
Following its independence in 1960, the first president Modibo Keita changed the name of the 
country from the Mali Federation to the Republic of Mali (Lecocq 2010). The former failed to 
create a strong national identity, so the latter meant to “forge a sense of national unity around 
southern Mali’s proudest moments” (Smith 2014:11). However, this was not a successful 
attempt. Instead of unifying differences, it has magnified divisions within the society. The new 
name meant that “the Malinke, the Bambara and other Mande ethnic groups were ‘true Malians’, 
who must be favored over all other ethnic groups within the state” (Smith 2014:11-12). This line 
of reasoning suggested that all the other ethnic groups were considered to be “holding a lower 
status” within the social and political segments of the government; thus, did not deserve to have 
“resources, political power and respect” (Smith 2014:12).  
 The construction of identities is a social process, and it suggests “a degree of arbitrariness 
and flexibility in the way [it] is composed … and in what its boundaries are” (Kelman 2005:4). 
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These decisions and choices reflect the interests of the political elites. This could be seen as a 
form of elite manipulation, which is conceptually different than what I referred to earlier. In the 
cases of Mali and Burkina Faso, it is apparent that the post-colonial governments had different 
visions regarding to what a nationally unified identity entails. The implications of such choices 
might be that in societies that share a strong national identity, violent conflicts may not be 
welcomed. However, in order to fully understand if, and to what extent, national identity may 
change people’s attitude and behavior towards violence, conducting interviews, survey and 
participant observation in these two countries might be necessary. 
 
History of Conflict 
 Within the conflict and security studies, the legacy of conflict is often considered as a 
root cause for intractable conflicts (Coleman 2003). These intractable conflicts almost 
exclusively refer to conflicts taking place on the national level; however, this argument should 
not be fully dismissed for sub-national conflict dynamics. Mali was once known as the “model of 
democracy, a growing center for the arts and the study of African history,” but the ongoing 
challenges of secessionism and military coups have “plunged the country into chaos” (Chilson 
2012: para.4). There are two long-term historical issues that explain the instability in Mali: “the 
history of the Tuareg [pastoralists], and the history of militant Islam in the region” (Keys 
2013:1).  
Since before the colonial era, there has been a strong tension between Tuareg people and 
the agricultural population residing in southern Mali. These two groups share “different origins 
and political aspirations;” yet, they are bound to live within the same borders due to the decisions 
of the French regime (Keys 2013:2). Until the final years of the colonial rule, the French did not 
see any value in economically investing into Tuareg people, their livelihoods and territories. 
Thus, Tuaregs were given local autonomy; while the south was ‘encouraged’ to “fully embrace 
the French political and cultural norms” (Keys 2013:2). Through this autonomy, the Tuareg were 
able to reject being assimilated into the French system. Unfortunately, this also meant that they 
were not able to “resist union with the south” following independence, as they lacked the 
economic and administrative skills to hold power (Chauzal and van Damme 2015:18). As of 
mid-1950s, the French came to realize that the Tuareg desert might be gifted with natural 
resources such as gas, oil and uranium; thus, it attempted to retain its authority over the region 
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and promised the Tuareg for a Tuareg-dominated super state. However, this idea was heavily 
challenged by the south, and neither the French nor the Tuareg could have what they wanted 
(Chauzal and van Damme 2015).  
Militant Islam, on the other hand, has been heavily present in Mali especially since the 
1990s. The drought during the 1970s had forced thousands of Tuaregs to migrate to Algeria and 
Libya. In Algeria, these refugees were exposed to political ideals of independence for Berbers 
(Tuaregs are from Berber descent). In Libya, they were recruited by Ghaddafi to serve in his 
army and equipped with weapons. Upon their return to Mali, Tuaregs were influenced by two 
events. First, the Algerian civil war (1991-2002) created a “tradition of armed Islamist 
insurrection,” which captured the attention of many Tuaregs (Keys 2013:3). Secondly, some of 
them were influenced by a “very conservative, though non-Islamist, Pakistani Muslim 
‘missionaries,’ who were present in the northern part of the country (Keys 2013:3). Furthermore, 
a number of Islamists in the region were inspired by the idea of re-establishing Muslim 
theocratic states. The combination of the secessionist ideals of Tuaregs and their Islamist 
ambitions, together with the availability of weapons, have resulted in multiple rebellions and laid 
the foundation of Mali’s instability.  
Burkina Faso has also had its own problems. The country has seen many demonstrations 
over poor paying conditions, high costs of living, and corruption. However, the government 
committed to “strengthening of democracy” and took concrete steps to address the issues brought 
forward by its citizens. Despite struggling with its own issues, Burkina Faso has managed to 
“retain its image as a small island of stability in a region plagued by drought and war” (Chilson 
2012: para.19).  
 As discussed earlier, although the legacy of conflict argument has often focused on civil 
conflicts, it might provide opportunities to unpack some of the dynamics on the communal level. 
In the case of Mali, one of the reason for why farmers do not trust the Fulani is because their 
‘perceived association with the religious militants,’ which has been a concern on the national 
level. This suggests that such a history of conflict could have implications for local clashes 
among ethnically different land user groups.  
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Social Local Institutions 
Natural resources such as land and water are fundamental for both farmers and herders to 
maintain their livelihoods. As such, local institutions are significantly important for managing 
the usage of these resources, “shaping people’s adaptive capacities” in the face of changing 
landscape, and mitigating tensions between different groups (Crane 2013:14). This is in line with 
the ‘common property resources’ (CPR) debate, which highlights the importance of community 
management for resource access and allocation (Hussein 1998). Areas without CPR management 
systems, or with ineffective ones, are more likely to experience violent conflicts.  
Since the colonial era in Mali, the institutional and customary practices of land tenure 
have transformed substantially. Until the late 1980s, Mali had a strong centralized government, 
which empowered civil servants to control the society. In the 1970s, rural communities were 
recognized as administrative units, “followed by statutory provision for rural organizations (Tons 
villageois) in 1985 (Hesseling 1996:33). However, these organizations lacked the “autonomous 
legal status;” instead, they were regarded as “merely intermediaries for the implementation of 
centrally formulated development programs” (Moorehead 1992L109). Despite the introduction 
of new laws, neither the French nor post-colonial regimes were able to fully eradicate the 
existing customary practices. As a result, there was a “legal chaos … with respect to land and 
natural resources” (Hesseling 1996:34). This “coexistence and interaction of multiple legal 
orders” have weakened the capacity of and people’s confidence in local institutions in mitigating 
conflicts (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2001, in Brottem 2013:72).  
After the revolution in 1991, the interim government prepared new policy 
recommendations for the incoming regime to address land tenure and environmental issues. 
However, the implementation of these recommendations was not successful due to the 
legislation’s “instrumentalist and positivist approach” towards creating a change (Hesseling 
1996:36). Malian government has referred to the law “as an instrument of social change” in the 
sense that legislation “is meant to adapt the behavior of citizens and make it consistent with the 
law” (Hesseling 1996:36). This approach has disregarded the “complex web of reciprocal 
relationships and social fields” on the local level, and led to conflict between state and customary 
law.  
 Until recently, similar issues could have been observed in Burkina Faso as well. The 
presence of state laws and customary practices often contradicted each other at the local level, 
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and increased the contesting claims among different land users. However, in 2009, the national 
government passed the Rural Land Tenure Law to address this ongoing issue. The law has been 
recognized as “one of the most innovative pieces of rural land legislation in West Africa” (Focus 
on Land n.d., para:5). In contrast to other African governments’ attempts of decentralization, 
land management under the Rural Land Tenure Law is indeed decentralized and customary 
rights at the local levels are recognized. The new law “facilitates legal recognition of individual 
and collective rights, inheritance through and certificates, land leases, and local land 
management institutions” (Focus on Land n.d., para:5). Furthermore, in areas where customary 
authority is no longer present, this new law attempts to “restore local management through the 
introduction of local rural land charters” (Focus on Land n.d., para:6).  
 These are important developments but this focus on the local institutions needs to be 
approached with caution. The developments in Burkina Faso, regarding to the land management 
and recognition of customary practices could serve as effective mechanisms to mitigate conflict 
among different land users. Yet, these are considerably new developments. Prior to the Rural 
Land Tenure Law, the land was managed in a similar fashion as in Mali. As such, it is important 
to note that the discussions over local institutions in Burkina Faso might not be able to offer a 
strong explanation for why Burkina Faso has not experienced communal conflicts to this point. 
However, the establishment of this new law might prove to be a valuable mitigating mechanism 
for future conflict dynamics.  
 
4.5.2. Conclusion 
These additional factors should not be seen as an exhaustive list. The intention of 
exploring other potential issues is to highlight that the relationship between climate change and 
communal conflict is indeed more complicating than initially assumed. This research confirms 
Brottem’s (2013) statement that “it is exceedingly difficult to pinpoint the exact causal 
relationship between environmental change, human response and social conflict” (pp.20). Such a 
relationship does not always have a linear pattern, but a complex and interlinked one.   
Moreover, these factors are not necessarily to be treated independently. For instance, 
social local institutions could provide a platform to establish interpersonal trust among different 
groups, which may then flourish associational life. On the other hand, the existence of social 
capital could pave the way for the establishment of information local institutions which could 
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oversee land-related issues. The issue of exclusion from the formulation of national identity 
could also be seen as an indicator of political marginalization. There are so many different ways 
for how climate change could be linked to violent conflicts at the local level. It is for this reason 
important to understand how different factors interact with one another when studying the 
relationship between multiple phenomena.   
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5. Conclusion 
5.1. Main Findings 
 The primary intention of conducting this research was to understand the dynamics that 
connect climate change and conflict on the local level. The significance of climate change for 
peace and security discourses is being acknowledged at an increasing rate; however, how exactly 
climate change is a concern for conflict is highly contested. Lack of data, selection biases and 
different interpretations are some of the reasons for this lack of consensus.  
 Studies to date have primarily focused on the implications of climate change on the 
national level. This may have been the case due to the convenience and availability of national 
data.  While these studies present valuable findings, they disregard the events taking place on the 
sub-national level. One of the agreements within the climate-security discussions is that climate 
change means different things, has different implications for different people and different 
locations. This is simply because the idea of vulnerability is not static; rather, it is shaped by “a 
host of complex social and economic factors, often associated with entitlements and access of 
individuals or groups to resources relative to the context in which these individuals, or groups 
sit” (Rance and Funfgeld 2014:8). Therefore, it is crucial for the international community to 
understand these local dynamics, as only then we can better assess how climate change impacts 
individuals, societies and nations.  
 To address this need, I studied the relationship between climate change and conflict on 
the sub-national level, with a particular focus on different land users – e.g. farmers and herders. 
Since climate change acts as a threat-multiplier, I relied on two different theoretical frameworks 
– environmental security and horizontal inequality – to understand under what factors climate-
driven environmental stress leads to communal conflict. Instead of testing several factors, I 
focused on only one factor – political marginalization – and tested the following hypothesis 
‘climate-induced environmental stress leads to communal conflict when some social groups are 
politically marginalized’ in Mali and Burkina Faso.  
  My findings suggest that there is not sufficient evidence neither to support my 
hypothesis, nor to reject it. While the impacts of climate change in exacerbating existing 
vulnerabilities is clearly displayed, the concept of political marginalization does not sufficiently 
explain the variation in the dependent variable in my cases. As discussed earlier, other factors 
such as the role of the elite, social capital, conflict legacy, sense of national unity, and local 
69 | Climate Conflicts? 
 
institutions might be able to provide more insight for the relationship between climate change 
and communal conflict. It is important to note that exploring other factors does not necessarily 
require dismissing political marginalization all together. Political marginalization might not lead 
to communal conflict within the context of climate change alone, but it may do so by interacting 
with other factors.  
 
5.2. Research Limitations 
 The primary limitation to this research has been the lack of data on the local level. The 
inability to conduct a field research required me to rely on the existing data for information and 
contextual knowledge. However, detailed analysis of the conflicts, and the role played by the 
elites and local organizations in specific locations were not available in the existing literature. 
These have prevented me from conducted an adequate process-tracing, considerably limited the 
scope of my research, and affected my findings. The data was further limited by the fact that 
several documents were only available in French. Although I was able to translate certain 
information, I was not able to access to all of them. 
 The second limitation to this research is the methodology of choice – small-N case study. 
This approach is the most appropriate when conducting process-tracing due to its high internal 
validity. However, it also means that small-N studies have a low external validity (George and 
Bennett 2005:25). Another limitation relates to my research design, MSSD, and my case 
selection for the small-N case study. I chose two cases in which the outcome of interest, 
communal conflict, was different. The intention behind this decision was to avoid committing a 
selection bias, which is common within the literature on climate change and conflict. However, it 
is possible that I might have still committed a selection bias by selecting cases that have a 
variation in the dependent variable. After all, “selecting cases so that there is a variation in the 
dependent variable is still selecting cases on the dependent variable” (Halperin and Heath 
2012:217).   
 The final limitation to this study considers the operationalization of dependent variable. I 
operationalized communal conflict as a ‘conflict on the sub-national level, involving informally 
organized groups, who use any material means as arms, and causing at least 25 battle-related 
deaths. The decision to operationalize communal conflict this way was due to the availability of 
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the data. However, the minimum threshold of 25-battle related deaths required me to exclude 
other conflicts that might have provided valuable insight for this research.   
 
5.3. Shortcomings and Recommendations for Future Research 
In addition to the discussed limitations, there are two main shortcomings to this research. 
First, political marginalization can mean many things. Within the framework of horizontal 
inequalities, it could be assessed by indicators involving “the control over the presidency, the 
cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the bureaucracy, local and regional governments, the army 
and the police” (Stewart 2009:5). In other studies, political marginalization could refer to “low 
political interest and low political trust” (Oskarson 2010:9; Andersen 2001). In this research, I 
conceptualized political marginalization using only two indicators, which limited the scope of 
the concept. It is possible that the inconclusiveness of my findings might be in part due to how 
the concept was conceptualized and operationalized in this study. Thus, discussions over political 
marginalization should still be included in future conflict research, and its operationalization 
should be done with caution.  
The second major shortcoming relates to the role of the elite in mobilizing its 
constituencies. Several studies (Vashney 2002; Posner 2005; Brottem 2013) have recognized the 
role of the elite for political stability. This research finds that the role of the elite in affecting the 
behavior of its people could offer some explanation for the presence of communal conflict in 
Mali; however, this link is not strong enough. While there is some evidence that in Mopti region, 
Fulani elites had been trying to mobilize their people, it is not certain how they manipulated their 
people and to what extent these forces played a role in the individually assessed conflicts. As 
such, the potential role of the elite mobilization in Mali’s communal conflicts is not based on 
evidence, but an assumption.  
Additionally, the role of the elite in unifying different ethnic groups in Burkina Faso 
remains unclear. Discussions that focus on the low-conflict profile of Burkina Faso make a 
reference to the elites’ attitude in avoiding the use of ethnic card as a potential explanation 
(Kirwin 2010); however, they fail to provide a causal relationship. This is an area that requires 
much more attention and in-depth research. Moreover, I categorized the mobilization by the elite 
as a mechanism that would connect political marginalization and communal conflict within the 
context of climate change. In order to study the potential relationship between the role of the 
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elite and the variation in the dependent variable, it might be more appropriate to treat it as an 
intervening, or independent, variable.  
This research does not produce as conclusive results as I expected. Yet, it provides 
several opportunities for future research. The overarching focus of the study, climate change and 
conflict, is highly relevant for the present day global security issues, and its significance will 
only grow in the years to come. My focus also acknowledges a gap within the existing literature 
which requires urgent attention. In this sense, this research should be considered as a first step in 
the direction of better understanding the implications of climate change at the local level. I have 
offered several factors that could shed some light for the climate-conflict relationship, but more 
detailed analysis is needed. 
Secondly, the research at hand recognizes the need to approach this topic using different 
theoretical frameworks. The implications of climate change on societies can only be fully 
understood by studying its interaction with other social, political and economic circumstances. 
Incorporating different theoretical frameworks could allow us to discover new connections 
between different factors that might have been overlooked before. Moreover, I believe that the 
simple recognition of the role of the climate change as a threat multiplier, requires the 
incorporation of other theories into the climate-conflict discussions.  
As Al Gore once said: “The climate crisis is the greatest challenge humanity has ever 
faced. The climate crisis will affect everything that we love and alter the course of our future” 
(2013). It is for this reason we, as the international community, must do everything within our 
power to fully comprehend the effects of climate change and to develop appropriate measures to 
protect ourselves from loss, pain and suffering. Not only we owe to this ourselves, but we owe it 
to the future generations.  
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ANNEX 
Annex 1. Indicators Utilized by Component of Vulnerability, USAID (2014) 
Component Indicator 
Code 
Data Layer 
Exposure PRCP 
 
Average annual precipitation (1950-2009) 
IACV Inter-annual coefficient of variation in precipitation 
(1950-2009) 
DCVAR % of precipitation variance explained by decadal 
component (1950-2009) 
NDVICV Coefficient of variation of the Normalized Difference 
Vegetation Index (NDVI) (1981-2007) 
TTREND Long-term trend in temperature in July-August-
September (1950-2009) 
FLOOD 
 
Flood Frequency (1999-2007) 
Sensitivity HHWL 
 
Household wealth (2006) 
STNT 
 
Child stunting (2006) 
IMR 
 
Infant mortality rate (IMR) (2006) 
POVI 
 
Poverty Index by commune (2008) 
CONF 
 
Conflict events/political violence (1997-2012) 
CARB 
 
Soil organic carbon/soil quality (1950-2005) 
MALA 
 
Malaria stability index 
Adaptive Capacity EDMO 
 
Education level of mother (2006) 
MARK 
 
Market accessibility (travel time to major cities) 
HEALTH 
 
Health infrastructure index (2012) 
ANTH 
 
Anthropogenic biomes (2000) 
IRRI 
 
Irrigated areas (area equipped for irrigation) (1990-2000) 
Source: USAID (2014).  
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Annex 2. Vulnerability Index for Each Component (Mali) 
Source: USAID (2014).  
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Annex 3. Vulnerability to Weather Related Disasters (Mali and Burkina Faso) 
Droughts, floods, extreme temperatures (% of population affected, average) (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Climate Change Vulnerability Monitor, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS) (2017).  
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Annex 4. Vulnerability to Loss of Agricultural Productivity (Mali and Burkina Faso) 
Impact on agriculture (% of GDP) (2080) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Climate Change Vulnerability Monitor, The Hague Center for Strategic Studies (HCSS) (2017).  
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Annex 5. Country Scores for Each HDR Indicator  
 
Annex 5.1. Human Development Index (HDI) and Sub-Values: Mali and Burkina Faso 
 HDI 
Value 
HDI 
Rank 
Life 
Expectancy 
at Birth 
Expected 
Years of 
Schooling 
Mean Years 
of Schooling 
GNI per capita 
(PPP US$) 
Mali 0.442 175 58.5 8.4 2.3 2,218 
Burkina Faso 0.402 185 59.0 7.7 1.4 1,537 
 
 
Annex 5.2. Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) and Sub-Values: Mali and Burkina Faso 
 IHDI 
Value 
Overall 
Loss (%) 
Human 
Inequality 
Coefficient 
(%) 
Inequality in 
Life 
Expectancy at 
Birth (%) 
Inequality in 
Education 
(%) 
Inequality in 
Income (%) 
Mali 0.293 33.7 32.7 40.4 41.6 16.1 
Burkina Faso 0.267 33.6 33.3 37.1 38.6 24.2 
 
 
Annex 5.3. Gender Development Index (GDI) and Sub-Values: Mali and Burkina Faso 
 Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
Expected 
Years of 
Schooling 
Mean 
Years of 
Schooling 
GNI per 
capita 
HDI Values F-M 
Ratio 
Female Male F M F M F M F M GDI 
Value 
Mali 58.3 58.6 7.5 9.4 1.7 3.0 1,349 3,071 0.385 0.491 0.786 
Burkina Faso 60.3 57.6 7.3 8.1 1.0 2.0 1,278 1,800 0.375 0.429 0.874 
 
 
Annex 5.4. Gender Inequality Index (GII) and Sub-Values: Mali and Burkina Faso 
 GII 
Value 
GII 
Rank 
Maternal 
Mortality 
Ratio 
Adolescent 
Birth Rate 
Female 
Seats in 
Parliament 
(%) 
Pop. with at 
least Some 
Secondary 
Edu. (%) 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate (%) 
F M F M 
Mali 0.689 156 587 174.6 8.8 7.3 16.2 50.1 82.3 
Burkina 
Faso 
0.615 146 371 108.5 9.4 6.0 11.5 76.6 90.7 
 
 
Annex 5.5. Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and Sub-Values: Mali and Burkina Faso 
 Survey 
Year 
MPI 
Value 
Head-
Count 
(%) 
Intensity of 
Deprivation 
(%) 
Population Share (%) Contribution to Overall 
Poverty of Deprivations 
(%) 
Near 
Poverty 
In 
Severe 
Poverty 
Below 
Income 
Poverty 
Line 
Health Edu. Living 
Standards 
Mali 2012-
2013 
0.456 78.4 58.2 10.8 55.9 49.3 22.4 37.9 39.7 
Burkina 
Faso 
2010 0.508 82.8 61.3 7.6 63.8 43.7 22.5 39.0 38.5 
Source: UNDP (2016) 
